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MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE 41-5-4 
a period of two years from and after the requiring the approval of rates and policies 
effective date of this act." by insurance commissioner prior to issu-
ance or sale. 
Title of Act. 
An act authorizing finance companies to 
write motor vehicula r insurance subject to 
certain restrictions and limiting to types 
of insurance to be sold; authorizing the 
commissioner of insurance to make rules 
and regulations governing the same; pro-
viding exception to the general insurance 
code as applied to such companies, and 
Collateral References. 
Insurancee:::>4, 
44 C.J.S. Insurance § 62. 
What constitutes "upset" or "overturn-
ing" within provisions of property dam-
age policy covering losses so caused, 8 A. 
L. R. 2d 1433. 
41-5-2. Rules and regulations.-The state insurance commissioner is 
hereby authorized to make such rules and regulations necessary for the 
proper control and management of finance companies writing and issuing 
insurance policies or contracts under the provisions of this act respecting 
insurance written by such finance companies. 
History: L. 1947, ch. 62, § 2; C, 1943, 
Supp., 57-6a-16. 
41-5-3. Submission of rates and copy of policy to insurance commis-
sioner.-Said companies must submit the rates to be charged for such in-
surance and a copy of the contract or policy of insurance proposed to be 
written by the finance company to the insurance commissioner, and obtain 
his approval of such policy and rates prior to the issuance or sale of any 
such policy. 
Hist ory: L. 1947, ch. 62, § 3; C, 1943, 
Supp., 57-6a-17. 
41-5-4. Applicability of general insurance code.-The provisions of the 
general insurance code relating to eligibility of investments, deposits of 
securities and capital and surplus requirements shall not be applicable to 
finance companies operating under the provisions of this act; except that 
section 31-12-4 and section 31-12-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953, shall be 
applicable and in compliance with requirements of Title 31, Chapter 13, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
History: L. 1947, ch. 62, § 4; C. 1943, Compiler's Notes. 










* * * Utah Code Annotated 1953." 
CHAPTER 6 
TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 
DEFINITIONS OF TERMS, 41-6-1 TO 41-6-10. 
EFFEC1' m' AND OBEDIENCE TO TRAFFIC REGULATIONS, 41-6-11 TO 41-6-19, 
TRAFFIC SIGNS, SIGNALS AND MARKINGS, 41-6-20 TO 41-6 -28, 
ACCIDENTS, 41-6-29 TO 41-6-42, 
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS DRIVING, 41-6-43 TO 41-6-45. 
SPEED RESTRICTIONS, 41-6-46 1'0 41-6-52.1. 
REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO DRIVING ON RIGHT SIDE OF HIGHWAY, OVER· 
TAKING, PASSING AND OTHER RULES OF THE ROAD, 41-6-53 TO 41-6-65. 
TURNS AND SIGNALS ON STARTING, STOPPING OR TURNING, 41-6-66 TO 41-6-71. 
RiGHT OF WAY, 41-6-72 TO 41-6-76, 
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10. PEDESTRIANS' RIGHTS AND DUTIES, 41-6-77 TO 41-6-79, 41-6-80.1 TO 41-6-82 [ 41-
6-80 Repealed]. 
11. BICYCLES, REGULATION OF OPERATION, 41-6-83 TO 41-6-90. 
12. RAILROAD TRAINS AND SAFETY ZONES, 41-6-91 TO 41-6-94. 
13. SPECIAL STOPS REQUIRED, 41-6-95 TO 41-6-100.10. 
14. STOPPING, STANDING AND PARKING, 41-6-101 TO 41-6-104. 
15. MISCELLANEOUS RULES, 41-6-105 TO 41-6-116. 
16. EQUIPMENT, 41-6-117 TO 41-6-175. 
ARTICLE 1 
DEFINITIONS OF TERMS 
Definitions. 






Authorized emergency vehicle-School bus-Various types of tractors. 
Truck-Bus-Various types of trailers. 





Gross weight-Department-Various persons-Local authorities. 
Streets, highways and roads and portions thereof. 




Official traffic-control device or signal-Railroad sign or signal-Traf-
fic-Right of way-Guide dog. 
Stop, stopping or standing-Park. 
41-6-1. Definitions.-The following words and phrases when used in 
this act shall, for the purpose of this act, have the meanings respectively 
ascribed to them. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 1; C. 1943, 
57-7-78; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment deleted "in this ar-
ticle" appearing after "ascribed to them"; 
deleted the definitions formerly a part of 
this section and re-enacted the definitions 
into new sections 41-6-2 to 41-6-10. 
Former sections 57-7-1 to 57-7-77, R. S. 
1933 were repealed by Laws 1941, ch. 52, 
§ 158. 
Title of Act. 
An act regulating traffic on highways 
and defining certain crimes in the use and 
operation of vehicles; providing for in-
spection of vehicles and prescribing the 
equipment used thereon; requiring the 
filing of reports of accidents on highways 
by operators or occupants of motor ve-
hicles involved; providing for traffic signs 
and signals, and defining the power of local 
authorities to enact or enforce ordinances, 
rules, or regulations in regard to matters 
embraced within the provisions of this act; 
prov iding for the enforcement of this act 
and prescribing penalties for the violation 
thereof, and making uniform the law re-
lating to the subject matter of this act; 
and repealing Sections 36-1-23, 36-1-25, and 
36-1-35, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933 
and repealing Section 36-1-26, Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933 as amended by 
Chapter 48, Laws of Utah, 1935, and re-
pealing Section 36-1-2lx as enacted by 
Chapter 48, Laws of Utah, 1935; and re-
pealing Chapter 7 of Title 57, Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933, including in such 
repeal Sections 57-7-55 as amended by 
Chapter 40, Laws of Utah, 1933, as amend-
ed by Chapter 48, Laws of Utah, 1935, 
and Sections 57-7-6, 57-7-10, 57-7-11, 57-7-
12, 57-7-16, 57-7-21, 57-7-23, 57-7-24, 57-7-25, 
57-7-29, 57-7-36, 57-7-42, 57-7-44, 57-7-47, 
57-7-48, 57-7-56, 57-7-60, 57-7-66, 57-7-74, 
57-7-75, and 57-7-76, as amended by Chap-
ter 48, Laws of Utah, 1935, and also 
repealing Sections 57-7-lOx, 57-7-23x, 57-7-
50x, 57-7-64x, 57-7-64xl, 57-7-64x2, 57-7-
64x3, 57-7-64x4, and 57-7-64x5, as enacted 
by Chapter 48, Laws of Utah, 1935. 
Uniform Laws. 
The Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on 
Highways was declared obsolete by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws in August 1943. (See 
Handbook of the National Conference, 
1943, page 69 and the 1959 Handbook, 
pages 296, 297.) 
In 1949 the Conference endorsed the 
Uniform Vehicle Code revised and ap-
proved by the National Conference on 
Street and Highway Safety. In 1948 the 
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National Conference endorsed certain re-
visions approved by the National Confer-
ence on Street and Highway Safety. 
The Motor Vehicle Act Regulating Traf-
fic on Highways was adopted in Illinois, 
Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, Puerto Rico, and 
with modifications in Arkansas, Colorado, 
Pelaware, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
New Mexico, North Carolina, North Da-
kota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia 
and Washington. 
Cross-References. 
:Municipal regulations, 10-8-30. 
Words and phrases defined by statute, 
construction of, 68-3-11. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles@::::>1-3, 6. 
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 1-8, 16. 
7 Am. Jnr. 2d 598, 599, 603 et seq., 775, 
Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 1, 2, 
10 et. seq., 225. 
Applicability of regulations or rules 
governing vehicular traffic to driveways 
or other places not legal highways, 80 A. 
L. R. 469. 
Applicability of state or municipal traf-
fic or vehicle regulations to those engaged 
in handling United States mail, 18 A. L. 
R. 1169. 
Liability for personal injuries by trac-
tor, 48 A. L. R. 939. 
Term "highway" in statutory provision 
relative to vehicle traffic as including 
street, 54 A. L. R. 1250. 
What is street or highway intersection 
within traffic rules, 7 A. L. R. 3d 1204. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Construction and application. 
This title pertains preponderantly to 
motor vehicles not confined to tracks, viz.: 
automobiles and motorcycles and the like. 
It is a Uniform Act designed to regulate 
nonrail vehicular traffic on streets, and, 
therefore, expressly excludes steam trains, 
trolley and interurban cars. Thorpe v. 
Bamberger R. Co., 107 U. 265, 153 P. 2d 
541, discussing r epeal of former laws and 
holding that the power to require inter-
urban trains to stop at through streets 
was, by the legislature, granted to cities 
entirely independent of Title 41, U. C. A. 
1953, and referring to Title 10, which con-
tains most of the power granted by the 
legislature to cities and towns. 
Subsection (a) of this section, prior to 
1949 amendment, excluded from the oper-
ation of this act "vehicles used exclusively 
upon stationary rails and tracks." Thorpe 
v. Bamberger R. Co., 107 U. 265, 153 P. 
2d 541. 
41-6-2. Various types of vehicles.-(a) "Vehicle." Every device in, 
upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or 
drawn upon a highway, except devices moved by human power or used 
exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks. 
(b) "Motor Vehicle." Every vehicle which is self-propelled and every 
vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley 
wires, but not operated upon rails. 
( c) "Motorcycle." Every motor vehicle, other than a tractor, having 
a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel on not 
more than three wheels in contact with the ground and weighing less 
than 1250 pounds. 
( d) "Motor-Driven Cycle." Every motorcycle, including every motor 
scooter, with a motor which produces not to exceed five horsepower, and 
every bicycle with motor attached. 
( e) "Bicycle." Every device propelled, by human power upon which 
any person may ride, having two tandem wheels either of which is over 
twenty (20) inches in diameter. 
(£) "Special Mobile Equipment." Every vehicle not designed or used 
primarily for the transportation of persons or property and only inci-
dentally operated or moved over a highway, including but not limited 
to: ditch digging apparatus, well boring apparatus and road construction 
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and maintenance machinery such as asphalt spreaders, bituminous mixers, 
bucket loaders, tractors other than truck tractors, ditches [ ditchers], level-
ing graders, finishing machines, motor graders, road rollers, scarifiers, 
earth moving carry-alls and scrapers, power shovels and drag lines, and self-
propelled cranes and earth moving equipment. The term does not include 
house trailers, dump trucks, truck mounted transit mixers, cranes or shovels, 
or other vehicles designed for the transportation of persons or property to 
which machinery has been attached. 
History: C. 1943, 57-7-78.1, enacted by 
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1961 amendment added subsec. (f). 
The bracketed word "ditchers" was in-
serted by the compiler. 
Collateral References. 
AutomobilesP6. 
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 16. 
Airplane as within terms "vehicle," 
"motor vehicle," etc. , 165 A. L. R. 916. 
Motorcycle as within statute or ordi-
nance in relation to motorcars, motor-
driven cars, etc., 48 A. L. R. 1090, 70 
A. L. R. 1253. 
41-6-3. Authorized emergency vehicle-School bus-Various types of 
tractors.-(a) "Authorized Emergency Vehicle." Vehicles of the fire de-
partment, police vehicles, and such ambulances and emergency vehicles of 
municipal departments or public service corporations as are designated or 
authorized by the department or local authorities. 
(b) "School Bus." Every bus owned by a public or governmental 
agency and operated primarily for the transportation of school children 
or privately owned and primarily operated for the transportation of school 
children, except such vehicles as are chartered or leased by a school dis-
trict from a certified contract carrier, or common carrier, when such vehicles 
are subject to inspection by the public service commission of Utah. 
( c) "Truck Tractors." Every motor vehicle designed and used primarily 
for drawing other vehicles and not so constructed as to carry a load other 
than a part of the weight of the vehicle and load so drawn. 
( d) "Farm Tractors." Every motor vehicle designed and used pri-
marily as a farm implement for drawing plows, mowing machines, and 
other implements of husbandry. 
( e) "Road Tractor." Every motor vehicle designed and used for draw-
ing other vehicles and not so constructed as to carry any load thereon 
either independently or any part of the weight of a vehicle or load so 
drawn. 
History: C. 1943, 57-7-78.2, enacted by 
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; L. 1957, ch. 78, § 1; 
1961, ch. 86, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1957 amendment substituted "de-
partment" for "state road commission" 
before "or local authorities" in the first 
paragraph. 
The 1961 amendment rewrote subsec. 
(b), which read: "Every motor vehicle 
owned by a public or governmental agency 
and operated for the transportation of 
children to or from school or privately 
owned or operated for compensation for 
the transportation of children to or from 
school." 
1. Ambulance service. 
Ambulance operated by service regis-
tered with public service commission, and 
involved in accident while making emer-
gency run was "authorized emergency ve-
hicle" within meaning of statute and was 
in privileged status with respect to speed 
limits and traffic signals despite conten-
tions that ambulance driver was negligent 
as matter of law for exceeding speed 
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limit and ignoring traffic signals,, that am-
bulance service was not "public service 
corporation" within the meaning of law, 
and that ambulance service was not au-
thorized by "local authority." Howe v. 
Jackson, 18 U. (2d) 269, 421 P . 2d 159. 
41-6-4. Truck-Bus-Various types of trailers.-(a) "Truck." Every 
motor vehicle designed, used or maintained primarily for the transporta-
tion of property. 
(b) "Bus." Every motor vehicle equipped for carrying more than 10 
passengers and used for the transportation of persons other than a taxicab. 
(c) "Trailer." Every vehicle with or without motive power, other 
than a pole trailer, designed for carrying persons or property and for 
being drawn by a motor vehicle and so constructed that no part of its 
weight rests upon the towing vehicle. 
(d) "Semitrailer." Every vehicle with or without motive power, other 
than a pole trailer, designed for carrying persons or property and for 
being drawn by a motor vehicle and so constructed that some part of its 
weight and that of its load rests upon or is carried by another vehicle. 
( e) "Pole Trailer." Every vehicle without motive power designed to 
be drawn by another vehicle and attached to the towing vehicle by means 
of a reach, or pole, or by being boomed or otherwise secured to the tow-
ing vehicle and ordinarily used for transporting long or irregular shaped 
loads such as poles, pipes or structural members capable, generally, of 
sustaining themselves as beams between the supporting connections. 
(f) "House Trailer." A trailer or semitrailer in excess of 1,500 pounds 
gross weight which is designed, constructed and equipped as a dwelling 
place, living abode or sleeping place either permanently or temporarily 
and is equipped for use as a conveyance on streets and highways, or 
(g) A trailer or a semitrailer whose chassis and exterior shell is 
designed and constructed for use as a house trailer, as defined in paragraph 
(f), but which is used instead permanently or temporarily for the adver-
tising, sales, display or promotion of merchandise or services, or for any 
other commercial purpose except the transportation of property for hire 
or the transportation of property for distribution by a private carrier. 
History: C. 1943, 57-7-78.3, enacted by 
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1961 amendment substituted "other 
than a taxicab" for "; and every motor 
vehicle, other than a taxicab, equipped 
and used for the transportation of persons 
for compensation" in subsec. (b) and 
added subsecs. (f) and (g). 
41-6-5. Tires-Railroad-Railroad train-Explosives-Liquids-Fission-
able material.-(a) "Pneumatic Tire." Every tire in which compressed 
air is designed to support the load. 
(b) "Solid Tire." Every tire of rubber or other resilient material 
which does not depend upon compressed air for the support of the load. 
( c) "Metal Tire." Every tire the surface of which in contact with 
the highway is wholly or partly of metal or other hard nonresilient ma-
terial. 
(d) "Railroad." A carrier of persons or property upon cars, operated 








( e) "Railroad Train." A steam engine, electric or other motor, with 
or without cars coupled thereto, operated upon rails. 
(f) "Explosives." Any chemical compound or mechanical mixture 
that is commonly used or intended for the purpose of producing an ex-
plosion and which contains any oxidizing and combustive units or other 
ingredients in such proportions, quantities or packing that an ignition 
by fire , by friction, by concussion, by percussion or by detonator of any 
part of the compound or mixture may cause such a sudden generation 
of highly h eated gases that the resultant gaseous pressures are capable 
of producing destructible effects on contiguous objects or of destroying 
life or limb. 
(g) "Flammable Liquid." Any liquid which has a flash point of 70 
degrees F. or less, as determined by a tabliabue or equivalent closed-cup test device. 
(h) "Corrosive Liquid." A strong mineral acid or other corrosive 
fluid which is liable to cause fire when mixed with chemicals or with 
organic matter. 
(i) "Fissionable Material." Any material whose nucleus will split into 
one or more approximate equal parts, when receiving energy from any 
external source. 
History: C. 1943, 57-7-78.4, enacted by 
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1961 amendment added subsec. (i). 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles<g:;:,6. 
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 16. 
Liability of motor vehicle owner or 
operator for accident occasioned by blow-
out or other failure of tire, 24 A. L. R. 
2d 161. 
41-6-6. Gross weight--Department-Various persons-Local authori-
ties.- (a) "Gross Weight." The weight of a vehicle without load plus the 
weight of any load thereon. 
(b) "Department." The department of public safety of this state. 
(c) "Persons." Every natural person, firm, copartnership, association or corporation. 
( d) "Pedestrian." Any person afoot. 
(e) "Driver." Every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle. 
(f) "Owner." A person who holds the legal title of a vehicle or in the 
event a vehicle is the subject of an agreement for the conditional sale or 
lease thereof with the right of purchase upon performance of the conditions 
stated in the agreement and with an immediate right of possession vested 
in the conditional vendee or lessee, or in the event a mortgagor of a vehicle 
is entitled to possession, then such conditional vendee or lessee or mort-
gagor shall be deemed the owner for the purpose of this act. 
(g) "Police Officer." Every officer authorized to direct or regulate 
traffic or to make arrests for violations of traffic regulations. 
(h) "Local Authorities." Every county, municipal, and other local 
board or body having authority to adopt local police regulations under the 
constitution and laws of the state. 
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History: C. 1943, 57-7-78.5, enacted by 
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1955 amendment substituted "de-
partment of public safety" for "state tax 
commission" in subsec. (b). 
1. Ambulance service. 
Ambulance operated by service regis-
tered with public service commission, and 
involved in accident while making emer-
gency run was "a uthorized emergency ve-
hicle" within the meaning of statute and 
was in privileged status with respect to 
speed limits and traffic signals notwith-
standing contention that ambulance serv-
ice was not authorized by particular "local 
authority" to serve as emergency vehicle 
where collision occurred. Howe v. Jack-
son, 18 U. (2d) 269, 421 P. 2d 159. 
41-6-7. Streets, highways and roads and portions thereof.- (a) "Street 
or Highway." The entire width between the boundary lines of every way 
publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of the public 
for purposes of vehicular travel. 
(b) "Private Road or Driveway." Every way or place in private own-
ership and used for vehicular travel by the owner and those having express 
or implied permission from the owner, but not by other persons. 
(c) "Roadway." That portion of highway improved, designed or 
ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of the berm or shoulder. 
In the event a highway includes two or more separate roadways the term 
"roadway" as used herein shall refer to any such roadway separately but 
not to all such roadways collectively. 
( d) "Sidewalk." That portion of a street between the curb lines, or 
the lateral lines of a roadway, and the adjacent property lines intended for 
the use of pedestrians. 
(e) "Laned Highway." A highway the roadway of which is divided 
into three or more clearly marked lanes for vehicular traffic. 
(f) "Through Highway." Every highway or portion thereof at the 
entrances to which vehicular traffic from intersecting highways is required 
by law to stop before entering or crossing the same and when stop signs 
are erected as provided in this act. 
(g) "Limited-access Highway." Every highway, street, or roadway 
in respect to which owners or occupants of abutting lands and other persons 
have no legal right of access to or from the same except at such points only 
and in such manner as may be determined by the public authority having 
jurisdiction over such highway, street, or roadway. 
(h) "Arterial Street." Any United States or state numbered route, 
controlled access highway, or other major radial or circumferential street 
or highway designated by local authorities within their respective jurisdic-
tions as part of a major arterial system of streets or highways. 
History: C. 1943, 57-7-78.6, enacted by 
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1955 amendment added subsec. (h). 
Cross-Reference. 
Limited-access facilities, 27-12-111 et seq. 
1, Roadways. 
Not every driveway between a sidewalk 
and a street falls within definition of road-
way; pedestrian who was walking along 
edge of driveway ancl was out of regular 
course of travel was not contributorily 
negligent as a matter of law as to motorist 
who backed from garage and strnck h er. 
Ivie v. Richardson, 9 U. (2d) 5, 336 P. 2d 
781. 
Collateral References. 
A utomo bilese=:>6. 
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 16. 
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Liability of t enant occupying abutting 
premises for injury from ice formed on 
sidewalk by discharge of rain or melted 
snow thereon because of condition exist-
ing on premises, 22 A. L. R. 2d 738. 
41-6-8. Intersection-Crosswalk-Safety zone-Business, residence, and 
urban districts.- (a) "Intersection." (1) The area embraced within the 
prolongation or connection of the lateral curblines, or, if none, then the 
lateral boundary lines of the roadways of two highways which join one 
another at, or approximately at, right angles, or the area within which 
vehicles traveling upon different highways joining at any other angle come 
in conflict. 
(2) Where a highway includes two roadways (30) feet or more apart, 
then every crossing of each roadway of such divided highway by an inter-
secting highway shall be regarded as a separate intersection. In the event 
such intersecting highway also includes two roadways (30) feet or more 
apart, then every crossing of two roadways of such highways shall be re-
garded as a separate intersection. 
(b) "Crosswalk." That part of a roadway at an intersection included 
within the connections of the lateral lines of the sidewalks on opposite sides 
of the highway measured from the curbs, or in the absence of curbs, from 
the edges of the traversable roadway; any portion of a roadway at an inter-
section or elsewhere distinctly indicated for pedestrian crossing by lines or 
other markings on the surface. 
( c) "Safety Zone." The area or space officially set apart within a 
roadway for the exclusive use of pedestrians and which is protected or is 
so marked or indicated by adequate signs as to be plainly visible at all 
times while set apart as a safety zone. 
( d) "Business District." The territory contiguous to and including a 
highway when within any 600 feet along such highway there are buildings 
in use for business or industrial purposes, including but not limited to 
hotels, banks or office buildings, railroad stations, and public buildings 
which occupy at least 300 feet of frontage on one side or 300 feet collec-
tively on both sides of the highway. 
( e) "Residence District." The territory contiguous to and including a 
highway not comprising a business district when the property on such 
highway for a distance of 300 feet or more is in the main improved with 
residences or residences and building in use for business. 
(f) "Urban Districts." The territory contiguous to and including any 
street which is built up with structures devoted to business or industry, 
or where dwelling houses are situated at intervals of less than 100 feet for 
a distance of a quarter of a mile or more. 
History: C. 1943, 57-7-78.7, enacted by 
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1955 amendment added subsec. (f). 
1. Crosswalks. 
Even though many people may cross a 
street at a certain place, a crosswalk is 
not created since use, by itself, does not 
establish a right of way for pedestrians. 
Langlois v. Rees, 10 U. (2d) 272, 351 P. 
2d 638. 
The statutory definition implies that 
there is an unmarked crosswalk only if 
a street's sidewalk ( or the edge of the 
traversable roadway) is intersected and 
continues on and if a pedestrian way ter-
minates at an intersection, it terminates 
without crossing the street unless it con-
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tinues as a marked crosswalk. Langlois v. 
Rees, 10 U. (2d) 272, 351 P. 2d 638. 
2. "Intersection." 
Jury was properly instructed that site 
of collision was "intersection" under stat-
ute prohibiting passing another vehicle 
within 100 feet of intersection in light of 
evidence that crossing road intersected 
main highway from both east and west 
and crossed it at right angles, that main 
highway was widened for about 1/10 of 
a mile in both directions to provide extra 
lane for acceleration and deceleration in 
entering or leaving highway and that there 
were stop signs at both east and west 
side to warn oncoming traffic; result was 
not changed by fact that the crossing road 
was only infrequently traveled dirt road 
and not readily observable to main high-
way traveler. Hathaway v. Marx, 21 U. 
(2d) 33, 439 P. 2d 850. 
Collateral References. 
Intersection: What is a street or high-
way intersection within traffic rules, 7 A. 
L . R. 3d 1204. 
Street corner or intersection, parking 
illegally at or near, as affecting liability 
for motor vehicle accident, 4 A. L. R. 3d 
324. 
41-6-9. Official traffic-control device or signal-Railroad sign or signal 
-Traffic-Right of way-Guide dog.-(a) "Official Traffic-Control De-
vices." All signs, signals, markings and devices not inconsistent with 
this act placed or erected by authority of a public body or official having 
jurisdiction, for the purpose of regulating, warning or guiding traffic. 
(b) "Official Traffic-Control Signals." Any device, whether manually, 
electrically or mechanically operated, by which traffic is alternately directed 
to stop and to proceed. 
(c) "Railroad Sign or Signal." Any sign, signal or device erected by 
authority of a public body or official or by a railroad and intended to give 
notice of the presence of railroad tracks or the approach of a railroad train. 
( d) "Traffic." Pedestrians, ridden or herded animals, vehicles, and 
other conveyances either singly or together while using any highway for 
purposes of travel. 
(e) "Right of Way." The right of one vehicle or pedestrian to proceed 
in a lawful manner in preference to another vehicle or pedestrian approach-
ing under such circumstances of direction, speed and proximity as to 
give rise to danger of collision unless one grants precedence to the other. 
(f) "Guide Dog." Every dog, which has been specially trained and 
is being used for guiding a person wholly or partially blind, while such 
dog is equipped with a harness designed for the purpose of such guiding. 
History: C. 1943, 57-7-78.8, enacted by 
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1; 
1961, ch. 86, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1955 amendment substituted "road-
way" for "highway" in subsec. (e). 
The 1961 amendment rewrote subsec. (e) 
which formerly read "The privilege of 
the immediate use of the roadway," and 
added subsec. (f), 
1. Right of way statutes. 
The right of way statutes are designed 
to prevent an accident by two persons 
both otherwise lawfully on the roadway 
reaching the same place at the same time. 
The right of way is not absolute for either 
pedestrian or motorist, but both have a 
continuing duty at all times to use rea-
sonable care for the safety of others, even 
when one has the right of way over the 
other. Langlois v. Rees, 10 U. (2d) 272, 
351 P. 2d 638. 
41-6-10. Stop, stopping or standing-Park.-(a) "Stop." When re-
quired means complete cessation from movement. 
(b) "Stop, Stopping, or Standing." When prohibited means any stop-




necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic or in compliance with the 
directions of a police officer or traffic-control sign or signal. 
( c) "Park." When prohibited means the standing of a vehicle, 
whether occupied or not, otherwise than temporarily for the purpose of 
and while actually engaged in loading or unloading. 
History: C. 1943, 57-7-78.9, enacted by 
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1. Duties and liabilities between owners or 
drivers of parked or parking vehicles, 25 
A. L. R. 2d 1224. Cross-Reference. 
Disabled persons, parking privileges, 41-
1-49.9. 
Liability for injury to pedestrian grow-
ing out of pulling out of parked motor 
vehicle, 29 A. L. R. 2d 136. 
Collateral References. 
Autornobiles.g:;;,6. 
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 16. 
Parking illegally at or near street corner 
or intersection as affecting liability for 
motor vehicle accident, 4 A. L. R. 3d 324. 
ARTICLE 2 
EFFECT OF AND OBEDIENCE TO TRAFFIC REGULATIONS 
Section 41-6-11. Act relates to vehicles on highways-Exceptions. 
41-6-12. Violation of act-Misdemeanor. 
41-6-13. Obedience to police officer. 
41-6-14. Applicability and exemptions. 
41-6-15. Persons riding or driving animals to obey r egulations. 
41-6-16. Provisions of act uniform throughout state-Local regulations. 
41-6-17. Regulatory powers of local authorities-Stop sign or traffic-control 
signal on or affecting state highway-Necessity of posting of signs. 
41-6-18. Right of real property owner to r egulate traffic. 
41-6-19. Removal of brush, foliage or other obstruction impairing view. 
41-6-11, Act relates to vehic'1es on highways-Exceptions,-The provi-
sions of this act relating to the operation of vehicles refer exclusively to 
the operation of vehicles upon highways except: 
(1) Where a different place is specifically referred to in a given section. 
(2) The provisions of sections 41-6-29 to 41-6-45, inclusive shall apply 
upon highways and elsewhere throughout the state. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 2; C. 1943, 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 1-8, 16. 
57-7-79. 7 Am. Jur. 2d 598, 599, 603 et seq., 775, 
Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 1, 2, Collateral References. 10 et seq., 225. 
AutornobilesPl-3, 6. 
41-6-12. Violation of act-Misdemeanor.-It is unlawful, and, unless 
otherwise declared in this act with respect to particular offenses, it is a 
misdemeanor for any person to do any act forbidden or fail to perform 
any act required in this act. 




60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 16. 
7 Arn. Jur. 2d 723, Automobiles and 
Highway Traffic § 168. 
Validity and construction of statutes 
or ordinances which make noncompliance 
wHh motor vehicle r egulations a penal 
offense without r eference to intent, fault, 
or knowl edge, 11 A. L. R. 1434. 
Violation of statute or ordinance regu-
lating movement of vehicles as affecting 
violator's right to recover for negligence, 
12 A. L. R. 458. 
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41-6-13. Obedience to police officer.-N o person shall willfully fail or 
refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any police officer 
invested by law with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 4; C. 1943, 
57-7-81. 
1. Obedience to traffic officer, 
Pedestrian denied recovery - for injuries 
sustained when she was struck by over-
hang of motorbus where from the evi-
dence it appeared that when she was 
half-way across the street the traffic light 
changed against her and she stopped in 
the safety zone, giving the other traffic 
the right of way, and that the overhang 
of the bus struck her as it rounded the 
comer in response to traffic officer's ex-
press direction. Miller v. Utah Light & 
Traction Co., 96 U. 369, 86 P . 2d 37, 
applying R. S. 1933, 57-7-2. 
Collateral References, 
Automobiles@:;;> 10. 
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43. 
7 Am. Jur. 2d 609, Automobiles and 
Highway 'rraffic § 17. 
Motorists' liability for injury to one in 
or about a street or highway for the 
purpose of directing or warning traffic, 98 
A. L. R. 2d 1169. 
41-6-14. Applicability and exemptions.-(a) The prov1s10ns of this 
act applicable to the drivers of vehicles upon the highways shall apply to 
the drivers of all vehicles owned or operated by the United States, this 
state or any county, city, town, district, of [or] any other political subdi-
vision of the state, including authorized emergency vehicles; provided, how-
ever, that such authorized emergency vehicles shall be exempt from the 
driving restrictions imposed under sections 41-6-20 to and including 41-6-28, 
41-6-46 to and including 41-6-82 and 41-6-91 to and including 41-6-106 of this 
act when driven under the following conditions: 
(1) Said exemption shall apply whenever any said vehicle is being 
driven in response to an emergency call or when used in the pursuit of 
an actual or suspected violator of the law, or when responding to but not 
returning from a fire alarm. 
(2) Said exemption herein granted to an authorized emergency vehicle 
shall apply only when the driver of any said vehicle while in motion 
sotmds audible signal by bell, siren or exhaust whistle as may be reasonably 
necessary, and when the vehicle is equipped with at least one lighted lamp 
displaying a red light visible under normal atmospheric conditions from 
a distance of 500 feet to the front of such vehicle, except that an authorized 
emergency vehicle operated as a police vehicle need not be equipped with 
or display a red light visible from in front of the vehicle. 
(b) The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the driver of an author-
ized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the 
safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the driver from the 
consequences of an arbitrary exercise of the privileges declared in this sec-
tion. 
( c) The provisions of this act shall not apply to persons, teams, motor 
vehicles and other equipment while actually engaged in work upon the sur-
face of a highway, but shall apply to such persons and vehicles when trav-
eling to or from such work. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-14, re-enacted by 
L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1; L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1; 
1965, ch. 83, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Section 41-6-14 (L. 1941, ch. 52, § 5; C. 
1943, 57-7-82; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1), relating 
to applicability and exemptions from act 
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of certain drivers, was repealed by Laws 
1955, ch. 71, § 1. New section 41-6-14 was 
re-enacted by § 1 of the act. The pre-
liminary clause of section 1 read as fol-
lows: "Section 1. Secs. 41-6-6, 41-6-7, 41-6-8, 
41-6-9, 41-6-34, 41-6-36, 41-6-47, 41-6-49, 
41-6-70, 41-6-76, 41-6-77, 41-6-82, 41-6-90, 
41-6-114, 41-6-117, 41-6-120, 41-6-121, 41-6-
123, 41-6-124, 41-6-129, 41-6-131, 41-6-133, 
41-6-141, 41-6-142, 41-6-149, 41-6-159, and 
27-1-28, Utah Code Annotated 1953, are 
amended; secs. 41-6-14, 41-6-64, 41-6-130, 
41-6-132, 41-6-134, 41-6-135, 41-6-140, and 
41-6-144, Utah Code Annotated 1953, are 
repealed and re-enacted; and new sections 
41- 6- 43.10, 41- 6- 72.10, 41- 6 -121.10, 41 - 6-
140.10, 41-6-140.20, 41-6-154.10, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, a r e enacted to 
read: * * * ." 
The 1961 amendment added "except that 
* * * front of the vehicle" to subd. (2) of 
sub sec. (a) and deleted sub secs. (b) and 
( c) which were restored by the 1965 
amendment. 
The 1965 amendment added subsecs. (b) 
and ( c) relating to the duty of care of the 
driver of a n emergency vehicle and the 
exemption of persons working on the high-
ways. 
1. Ambulance service. 
Ambulance operated by service regis-
tered with public service commission, and 
involved in accident while making emer-
gency run was "authorized emergency ve-
hicle" within the meaning of statute and 
was in privileged status with respect to 
speed limits and traffic signals despite con-
tentions that ambulance driver was negli-
gent as matter of law for exceeding speed 
limit and ignoring traffic signals and that 
ambulance service was not "public service 
corporation" within the meaning of law. 




60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43. 
7 Am. Jur. 2d 726, Automobiles and 
Highway Traffic § 172. 
Applicability of motor vehicle regula-
tions to public officials or employees, 19 
A. L . R. 459, 23 A. L. R. 418 . 
Constmction and application of statute 
making municipal corporation liable for 
damages due to negligence of official or 
employee while operating vehicle, 136 A. 
L. R. 582. 
Criminal or penal responsibility of pub-
lic officer or employee for violating speed 
regulation, 9 A. L. R. 367. 
Inspection of motor vehicles by munici-
pal authorities as pertaining to the gov-
ernmental or to the proprietary functions 
of the municipality as regards liability 
for damage or injury, 133 A. L. R. 1216. 
Personal liability of public official for 
injury on highway, 40 A. L. R. 39, 57 A. 
L. R. 1037. 
Responsibility of public officer for neg-
ligence of subordinate in operation of 
vehicle, 3 A. L. R. 149. 
Use of municipal automobile as a cor-
porate or as a governmental function, llO 
A. L. R. 1117, 156 A. L. R. 714. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Accident involving emergency vehlcle. 
In au action for injuries suffered by 
plaintiff in an accident with a police 
vehicle which occurred at an intersection, 
the question as to whether plaintiff had 
been contributorily negligent was one of 
fact for the jury and an instruction on the 
issue of assumption of risk from which 
jury could have believed that the plaintiff 
would be barred from recovery by assump-
tion of risk even if she had exercised due 
care under the circumstances, was error. 
Johnson v. Maynard, 9 U. (2d) 268, 342 
P. 2d 884. 
Plaintiff was not entitled to recover 
damages incident to an intersection colli-
sion between his car and car of defendant, 
a peace officer, responding to an emer-
gency call, where plaintiff was negligent 
in not hearing siren on defendant's car 
and defendant was driving at a reasonable 
speed of forty miles per hour while sound-
ing siren and displaying a red light. 
Martin v. Ehlers, 13 U. (2d) 236, 371 P. 
2d 851. 
Construction. 
The 1949 amendment placed limitations 
on the right of emergency vehicles to pro-
ceed past a red stop light. The red light 
must be burning on the vehicle and the 
siren sounding and the vehicle could pro-
ceed past the red stop light only after 
slowing down as may be necessary for 
safe operation. Thus the driver of a fire 
engine was negligent in passing through 
a red light with his siren and red light 
on but failing to slow down at the in-
tersection for safe operation. Jensen v. 
Taylor, 2 U. (2d) 196, 217 P. 2d 838. 
41-6-15. Persons riding or driving animals to obey regulations.-Every 
person riding an animal or driving any animal-drawn vehicle upon a 
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roadway shall be subject to the provisions of this act applicable to the 
driver of a vehicle, except those provisions of this act which by their 
nature can have no application. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 6; C. 1943, Collateral References, 
57-7-83. Automobiles<Pl0. 
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43. 
41-6-16. Provisions of act uniform throughout state-Local regulations. 
-The provisions of this act shall be applicable and uniform throughout 
this state and in all political subdivisions and municipalities therein and 
no local authority shall enact or enforce any rule or regulation in con-
flict with the provisions of this act unless expressly authorized herein. 
Local authorities may, however, adopt regulations consistent with this act, 
and additional traffic regulations which are not in conflict therewith. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 7; C. 1943, 
57-7-84. 
Cross-Reference. 




60 C.J.S. Motor V ehicles § 43. 
7 Am. Jur. 2d 607, 725, Automobiles 
and Highway Traffic § 15, 170. 
41-6-17. Regulatory powers of local authorities-Stop sign or traffic-
control signal on or affecting state highway-Necessity of posting of signs. 
- (a) The provisions of this act are intended to confer upon local 
authorities the right of, and shall not be deemed to deprive said authorities 
of existing powers with respect to highways under their jurisdiction and 
within the reasonable exercise of the police power in: 
(1) Regulating the standing or parking of vehicles, including the 
requirement for payment of a parking fee, which fee may vary, in order to 
relieve traffic congestion in designated areas. 
(2) Regulating traffic by means of police officers or traffic-control 
signals. 
(3) Regulating or prohibiting processions or assemblages on the high-
ways. 
( 4) Designating. particular highways as one-way highways and requir-
ing that all vehicles thereon be moved in one specific direction. 
(5) Regulating the speed of vehicles in public parks. 
(6) Designating any highway as a through highway and reqmrmg 
that all vehicles stop before entering or crossing the same or designating 
any intersection as a stop intersection and requiring all vehicles to stop 
at one or more entrances to such intersections. 
(7) Restricting the use of highways as authorized in section 27-1-34 
[27-12-145]. 
(8) Regulating the operation of bicycles and requiring the registration 
and licensing of same, including the requirement of a registration fee. 
(9) Regulating or prohibiting the turning of vehicles at intersections. 
(10) Altering the maximum speed limits as authorized herein. 
(11) Adopting such other traffic regulations as are specifically author-
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(b) No local authority shall erect or maintain any stop sign or traffic-
control signal at any location so as to require the traffic on any state 
highway to stop before entering or crossing any intersecting highway 
unless approval in writing has first been obtained from the state road 
commission. 
( c) No ordinance or regulation enacted under subdivisions 4, 5, 6, 7 
or 10 of this section shall be effective until signs approved by the state 
road commission giving notice of such local traffic regulations are posted 
upon or at the entrances to the highway or part thereof affected as may 
be most appropriate. 
History: L. 1941, ch, 52, § 8; C, 1943, 
57-7-85; L. 1949, ch, 65, § 1; 1961, ch. 
86, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment r ewrote subd. (7) 
and added subds. (8), (9), (10) and (11) 
of subsec. (a) , 
The 1961 amendment substituted "maxi-
mum" for "prima facie" in subd. (10) of 
subsec. (a) . 
The bracketed reference to section "27-
12-145" was inserted by the compiler. By 
error, the reference in the 1961 amendment 
was to "27-1-34" instead of "27-1-32." Laws 
1963, ch. 39, § 160 repealed 27-1-32, and 
the present provision covering the same 
subject is compiled as 27-12-145. 
1. Parking of vehicles. 
A city has no power to pass an ordi-
nance declaring owners of vehicles prima 
facie responsible for illegal parking of 
such vehicles. Nasfell v, Ogden City, 
122 U. 344, 249 P. 2d 507, 
2. Evidentiary Rules. 
City had no express or implied power, 
under subd. (a) (1) , to make presence of 
illegally parked vehicle prima facie evi-
dence that owner committed or authorized 
the violation. Nasfell v , Ogden City, 122 
U. 344, 249 P . 2d 507, 
Collateral References. 
Automobilese:::>7. 
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43. 
7 Am. Jur, 2d 606-607, 735, 736, Auto• 
mobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 13-15, 181, 
183. 
Conflict between statutes and local reg• 
ulations as to automobiles, 21 A. L. R. 
1186, 64 A. L . R. 993, 147 A. L. R. 522. 
Constitutionality of legislative delega• 
tion of powers to prescribe or vary regula-
tions concerning motor vehicles used on 
highways, 87 A. L. R. 546. 
Construction and operation of regula-
tions as to sudden stop or slowing of motor 
vehicle, 29 A. L. R. 2d 5. 
Traffic regulations, failure of munici-
pality to adopt or enforce as ground of 
its liability for damage to property or 
person, 92 A. L. R . 1495, 161 A. L . R. 1404. 
41-6-18. Right of real property owner to regulate trafflc.-Nothing in 
this act shall be construed to prevent the owner of real property used by 
the public for purposes of vehicular travel by permission of the owner 
and not as matter of right from prohibiting such use, or from requiring 
other or different or additional conditions than those specified in this 
act, or otherwise regulating such use as may seem best to such owner. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 9; C. 1943, Collateral References, 
57-7-86, Automobilese:::,10, 
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43. 
7 Am. Jur. 2d 723, Automobiles and 
Highway Traffic § 169. 
41-6-19. Removal of brush, foliage or other obstruction impairing 
view.-The state road commission, with reference to the state highways, 
and local authorities, with reference to highways under their jurisdiction, 
shall remove from said highways all brush, foliage, or other obstruction 
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which interferes with or impairs the view of an intersection or of a rail-
road grade crossing. 
History: C. 1943, 57-7-86.10, enacted by Collateral References. 
L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1. Automobilese::>6. 
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 16. 
ARTICLE 3 
TRAFFIC SIGNS, SIGNALS AND MARKINGS 
8ection 41-6-2,0. Traffic-control devices-Uniform state road commission manual. 
41-6-21. Placing and maintenance upon state highways. 
41-6-22. Placing and maintenance upon local highways by local authorities. 
41-6-23. Obeying devices- Effect of improper position, illegibility or absence 
-Presumption of lawful placement and compliance with act. 
41-6-24. Traffic-control signal-At intersections-At place other than inter-
section. 
41-6-25. Special pedestrian-control signals-Meaning of signals-Rights and 
duties. 
41-6-26. Flashing red or yellow signals-Rights and duties of drivers. 
41-6-26.5. Lane-direction-control signals. 
41-6-27. Prohibition of unauthorized signs, signals, lights or markings-Com-
mercial advertising-Public nuisance-Removal. 
41-6-28. Interference with signs and signals prohibited. 
41-6-20. Traffic-control devices-Uniform state road commission man-
ual.-The state road commission shall adopt a manual and specifica-
tions for a uniform system of traffic-control devices consistent with the 
provisions of this act for use upon highways within this state. Such 
uniform system shall correlate with and so. far as possible conform to the 
system then current as approved by the American association of state 
highway officials. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 10; C. 1943, Collateral References. 
57-7-87. Automobilese:,,10. 
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §43. 
7 Am. Jur. 2d 745-747, Automobiles and 
Highway Traffic §§ 194-196. 
41-6-21. Placing and maintenance upon state highways.-(a) The state 
road commission shall place and maintain such traffic-control devices in 
conformance with its manual and specifications upon all state highways 
as it shall deem necessary to indicate and to carry out the provisions of 
this act or to regulate, warn or guide traffic. 
(b) No local authority shall place or maintain any traffic-control de-
vice upon any highway under the jurisdiction of the state road commis-
sion except by the latter's permission. 
History: L. 1941, ch, 52, § 11; C. 1943, Compiler's Notes. 
57-7·88; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1. The 1949 amendment substituted "con-
formance with its manual" for "conform-
ing to its manual" in subsec. (a). 
41-6-22. Placing and maintenance upon local highways by local authori-
ties.-Local authorities, in their respective jurisdictions, shall place and 
maintain such traffic-control devices upon highways under their juris-
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diction as they may deem necessary to indicate and to carry out 
provisions of this act or local traffic ordinances or to regulate, warn 
guide traffic. All such traffic-control devices hereafter erected shall c1 
form to and be maintained in conformance with the state manual a. 
specifications. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 12; C. 1943, 
57-7-89; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Th e 1949 amendment inserted the com-
mas in the first sentence and inserted 
" and be maintained in conformance with" 
in the second sentence. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles~IO. 
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43. 
Conflict between statutes and local rei 
lations as to automobiles, 147 A. L. 
522. 
Constitutionality of legislative deleg 
tion of powers to prescribe or vary reg 
la tions concerning motor vehicles used o 
highways, 87 A. L. R. 546. 
41-6-23. Obeying devices-Effect of improper position, illegibility or 
absence-Presumption of lawful placement and compliance with act.-
( a) No driver of a vehicle shall disobey the instructions of any official 
traffic-control device applicable thereto placed in accordance with the 
provisions of this act, unless at the time otherwise directed by a police 
officer, subject to the exceptions granted the driver of an authorized 
emergency vehicle in this act. 
(b) No provision of this act, £or which official traffic-control devices 
are required, shall be enforced against an alleged violator if at the time 
and place of the alleged violation an official device is not in proper posi-
tion and sufficiently legible to be seen by an ordinarily observant person. 
·whenever a particular section does not state that official traffic-control 
devices are required, such section shall be effective even though· no devices 
are erected or in place. 
( c) Whenever official traffic-control devices are placed in position 
approximately conforming to the requirements of this act, such devices 
shall be presumed to have been so placed by the official act or direction of 
lawful authority, unless the contrary shall be established by competent 
evidence. 
( d) Any official traffic-control device placed pursuant to the provi-
sions of this act and purporting to conform to the lawful requirements 
pertaining to such devices shall be presumed to comply with the require-
ments of this act, unless the contrary shall be established by competent 
evidence. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 13; C. 1943, 
57-7-90; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1969, ch. 104, 
§ 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 a mendment added "unless at 
* * * in this act" to subsec. (a) and 
added sub sec. (b). 
The 1969 amendment substituted "offi-
cial traffic-control devices," "device," and 
"devices" for "sign" and "signs" in subsec. 
(b), and added subsecs. (c) and (d). 
Cross-Reference. 
Duty to obey police officers, 41-6-13. 
Collateral References. 
Liability for automobile accident other 
than direct collision with pedestrian as 
affected by r eliance upon or disregard of 
stop-and-go signal, 2 A. L. R. 3d 12. 
Liability for collision of automobile with 
pedestrian as affected by reliance upon or 
disregard of stop-and-go signal, 2 A. L. R. 
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Liability for collision of automobile with 
ueclestrian at intersection as affected by 
;.eliance upon or disregard of traffic sign 
o:· signal other than stop-ancl-go signal, 3 
A. L. R. 3d 557. 
Liability where automobile accident at 
intersection as affected by reliance upon 
or disregard of unchanging caution, slow, 
danger or like sign or signal, 3 A. L. R. 
3cl 507. 
Liability where automobile accident at 
intersection as affected by reliance upon 
or disregard of unchanging stop signal or 
sign, 3 A. L. R. 3d 180. 
Liability where automobile accident at 
intersection as affected by reliance upon 
or clisregard of "yield" sign or signal, 2 
A. L. R. 3d 275. 
Reckless driving as affected by traffic 
signs or signals, 52 A. L. R. 2d 1352. 
41-6-24. Traffic-control signal-At intersections-At place other than 
intersection.-Whenever traffic is controlled by a traffic-control signal 
exhibiting the words "Go," "Caution," or "Stop," or exhibiting different 
colored lights successively one at a time, or with arrows, the following 
colors only shall be used and said terms and lights shall indicate and apply 
to drivers of vehicles and pedestrians as follows: 
(a) "Green" alone. 
(1) Vehicular traffic facing the signal, except when prohibited under 
section 41-6-92, may proceed straight through or turn right or left unless a 
sign at such place prohibits either such turn. But vehicular traffic shall yield 
the right of way to other vehicles and to pedestrians lawfully within the 
intersection at the time such signal is exhibited. 
(2) Pedestrians facing the signal may proceed across the roadway 
within any marked or unmarked crosswalk. 
(b) Steady "Yellow" alone when showing following the "Green" 
signal. 
(1) Vehicular traffic facing the signal is thereby warned that the 
"Red" signal will be exhibited immediately thereafter and such vehicular 
traffic shall not enter or be crossing the intersection when the "Red" 
signal is exhibited. 
(2) Pedestrians facing such signal are thereby advised that there is 
insufficient time to cross the roadway, and any pedestrians then starting 
to cross shall yield the right of way to all vehicles. 
( c) Steady "Red" alone. 
(1) Vehicular traffic facing the signal shall stop before entering the 
nearest crosswalk at an intersection or at such other point as may be 
indicated by a clearly visible line and shall remain standing until "Green" 
is shown alone; provided that vehicular traffic stopped in the lane nearest 
the right-hand side of the highway, unless prohibited by a sign, may 
cautiously enter the intersection for the purpose of making a turn to the 
right but shall not interfere with other traffic nor endanger pedestrians 
lawfully within a crosswalk. 
(2) No pedestrian facing such signal shall enter the roadway unless 
he can do so safely and without interfering with vehicular traffic. 
(d) Steady "Red" with "green arrow." 
(1) Vehicular traffic facing such signal may cautiously enter the inter-
section only to make the movement indicated by such arrow, but shall 
yield the right of way to pedestrians lawfully within a crosswalk and to 
other traffic lawfully using the intersection. 
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(2) No pedestrian facing such signal shall enter the roadway un. 
he can do so safely and without interfering with vehicular traffic. 
( e) In the event an official traffic-control signal is erected and ma 
tained at a place other than an intersection, the provisions of this secti 
shall be applicable except as to those provisions which by their natl 
can have no application. Any stop required shall be made at a sign 
marking on the highway pavement indicating where the stop shall 
made, but in the absence of any such sign or marking the stop shall 1 
made at the signal. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 14; C. 1943, 
57-7-91; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1951, ch. 73, 
§ 1; 1961, ch. 86, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment added subsec. (e). 
Prior to the 1951 amendment the proviso 
in subd. (c)(l) read: "provided, that at 
intersections where signs or signals so 
indicate, vehicular traffic stopped in the 
lane nearest the right hand side of the 
highway may cautiously enter the inter-
section for the purpose of making a turn 
to the right but shall not interfere with 
other traffic nor endanger pedestrians law-
fully within a crosswalk." 
The 1961 amendment deleted "or 'go' " 
after "green" and "'green' alone" in 
subds. (a), (b) and (c) (1); deleted "or 
'stop' " after "Red" and " 'Red' alone" in 
subds. (b) (1) and (c); substituted "steady 
'yellow' alone" for " 'yellow' alone or 'Ca, 
tion'" in subd. (b); substituted "pede, 
trians" for "pedestrian" in subd. (b) (2) 
inserted "Steady" before "Red" in subdi 
( c) and ( d), and deleted "any" befor, 
"vehicular" in subd. (c)(2). 
Collateral References. 
Liability where automobile accident at 
intersection as affected by reliance upon 
or disregard of unchanging caution, slow, 
danger or like sign or signal, 3 A. L. R. 
3d 507. 
Liability where automobile accident at 
intersection as affected by reliance upon 
or disregard of unchanging stop signal or 
sign, 3 A. L. R. 3d 180. 
Liability for automobile accident other 
than direct collision with pedestrian as 
affected by reliance upon or disregard of 
stop-and-go signal, 2 A. L. R. 3d 12. 
41-6-25. Special pedestrian-control signals-Meaning of signals-Rights 
and duties.-Whenever special pedestrian-control signals exhibiting the 
words "Walk" or "Wait" or "Don't Walk" are in place, such signals shall 
indicate as follows: 
(a) "Walk"-Pedestrians facing such signal may proceed across the 
roadway in the direction of the signal and shall be given right of way by 
the drivers of all vehicles. 
(b) "Wait" or "Don't vValk"-No pedestrian shall start to cross the 
roadway in the direction of such signal, but any pedestrian who has 
partially completed his crossing on the walk signal shall proceed to a 
sidewalk or safety island while the wait or don't walk signal is showing. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 15; C. 1943, 
57-7-92; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment inserted "or 'Don't 
,valk'" in the first sentence and in subsec. 
(b) wherever it appears. 
Collateral References. 
Liability for collision of automobile with 
pedestrian as affected by reliance upon or 
disregard of stop-and-go signal, 2 A. L. R. 
3d 155. 
Liability for collision of automobile with 
pedestrian at intersection as affected by 
reliance upon or disregard of traffic sign 
or signal other than stop-and-go signal, 
3 A. L. R. 3d 557. 
41-6-26. Flashing red or yellow signals-Rights and duties of drivers. 
-Whenever an illuminated flashing red or yellow signal is used in an 
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official traffic-control device it shall require obedience by vehicular traffic 
as follows: 
(1) Flashing red (stop signal). When a red lens is illuminated by 
rapid intermittent flashes, drivers of vehicles shall stop before entering 
the nearest crosswalk at an intersection or at a limit line when marked, 
or, if none, then before entering the intersection, and the right to pro-
ceed shall be subject to the rules applicable after making a stop at a 
stop sign. 
(2) Flashing yellow ( caution signal). When a yellow lens is il-
luminated with rapid intermittent flashes, drivers of vehicles may pro-
ceed through the intersection or past such signal only with caution. 
ated" and "is used in an official traffic-
control device" in the first sentence; in-
serted "or, if none, then before entering 
the intersection" in subsec. (1). 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 16; C. 1943, 
57-7-93; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment inserted "illumin• 
41-6-26.5. Lane-direction-control signals.-When lane-direction-control 
signals are placed over the individual lanes of a street or highway, vehicular 
traffic may travel in any lane over which a green signal is shown, but 
shall not enter or travel in any lane over which a red signal is shown. 
History: c. 1953, 41-6-26.5, enacted by 
L. 1969, ch. 105, § 1. 
Title of Act. 
An act enacting a new section 41-6-26.5, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, relating to 
lane direction control signals to provide 
for directional control signals over indi-
vidual traffic lanes. 
41-6-27. Prohibition of unauthorized signs, signals, lights or markings 
-Commercial advedising-Public nuisance-Removal.-(a) No person 
shall place, maintain, or display upon or in view of any highway any 
unauthorized sign, signal, light, marking, or device which purports to be or 
is an imitation of or resembles an official traffic-control device or railroad 
sign or signal, or authorized emergency vehicle flashing light, or which at-
tempts to direct the movement of traffic, or which hides from view or inter-
feres with the effectiveness of any official traffic [-control] device or any 
railroad sign or signal, or which is of such brilliant illumination and so 
positioned as to blind or dazzle a driver on any highway adjacent thereto, 
and no person shall place or maintain nor shall any public authority permit 
upon any highway any traffic sign or signal bearing thereon any commercial 
advertising. This shall not be deemed to prohibit the erection upon private 
property adjacent to highways of signs giving useful directional infor-
mation and of a type that cannot be mistaken for official signs. 
(b) Every prohibited sign, signal, or light, or marking is declared to 
be a public nuisance and the authority having jurisdiction over the high-
ways is empowered to remove the same or cause it to be removed without 
notice. 
History : L. 1941, ch. 52, § 17; C. 1943, 
57-7-94; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1961, ch. 
86, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment inserted "or which 





The 1961 amendment inserted "light," 
before "marking" and "or a uthorized 
emergency vehicle flashing light" before 
"or which attempts" in the nrst sentence 
of subsec. (a) and substituted "prohibited 
sign, signal, or light, or marking" for 
"such prohibited sign, signal or ma 
and "highways" for "highway" in 1 (b). 
The bracketed word "-control" w 
serted by the compiler. 
41-6-28. Interference With signs and signals prohibited,-No pe 
shall without lawful authority attempt lo or in fact alter, deface, in; 
knock down, or remove any official traffic-control device or any raib 
sign or signal or any inscription, shield, or insignia thereon, or any o part thereof. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 18; C. 1943, 57-7-95. 
Section 41-6-29, n,,.,,.,, doty m event of acoidenf.-Stop at •eo•o of ,eeidoat-P, alty. 
41-6-30. Involving damage to vehicle--Misdemeanor. 
41-6-31. Give name-Render assistance. 
ARTICLE 4 
ACCIDENTS 
41-6-32. ColJision with unattended vehicle. 
41-6-33. Involving nxtures on or adjacent to highway. 
41-6-34. Accidents involving injury, death, or damage of $100 or more-Dut to notify police. 
41-6-35. Accident reports-Duty of driver, witnesses and investigating office to forward or r ender. 
41-6-36. Physical incapacity of driver-Duty of other occupants or owner t, 
notify police and make reports. 
41-6-37. Forms-Contents-Penalties for failure to make report. 
41-6-38. Livestock on highway-Collision, action for damages. 
41-6-39. Garage keeper to report damaged vehicle. 
41-6-40. Accident reports-Conndential-Privileged-Certincate of compliance. 41 -6-41. Statistical information pub1is11ed annually. 
41-6-42. Local powers. 
41-6.29. Driver's duty in event of accident-Stop at scene of accident 
-PenaltY,- (a) The driver of any vehicle involved in an aeeident resolt 
ing in injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop such Vehicle 
at the seen, of such accident or as close thereto as possible but shall 
then forthwith return to and in every event sha]J remain at the see,e 
of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of section 41-6-31. 
Every such stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than i, nec ssary. 
(b J Any person failing to stop or to comply with said requirements 
under such cir cumstances shall upon conviction be Punished by imprison. 
ment in the county jail for not less than thirty days nor more than one 
year or by fine of not less than $100 nor moce than $5,000 or by both such fine and imprisonment. 
(c) The department shall revoke the operator's or chauffeur's license 
of the person so convicted for a period not to exceed one year. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 19; C. 1943, Compiler's Notes. 
57-7-96; L. 1961, <h. 86, § l, Th, 1961 amendment iaae,ted "in the 
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J. Criminal prosecution. 
Where, in prosecution of hit-and-run 
ilriver under this section, evidence is dis-
cornrecl after t he jury has retired to com-
mence their deliberations which would 
sustain defendant's defense of alibi, it is 
abuse of discretion and rev ersible error to 
refuse to grant a new tTial on the ground 
of newly discovered eviden ce, which was 
not mernly cumulative. State v. Dunca n, 
102 U. 449, 132 P. 2d 121. 
Collateral References. 
AutomobilesPl0, 336. 
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43; 61 C.J.S. 
Motor Vehicles §§ 67 4-683. 
7 Am. Jur. 2d 799 et seq., 861, 880 , 
Automobiles an cl Highway Traffic §§ 246 et 
seq., 318, 336. 
Constitutionality, construction, and ef-
fect of statute in relation to conduct of 
driver of automobile after happening of 
an accident, 16 A. L. R. 1425, 66 A. L. R. 
1228, 101 A. L . R. 911. 
Failure to comply with statute requiring 
one involved in automobile accident to 
stop or report as affecting question as to 
suspension or tolling statute of limitation, 
10 A. L. R . 2d 564. 
Failure to stop or other conduct after 
automobile accident as supporting claim 
for exemplary damages, 156 A. L. R. 1115. 
Indictment or information charging fail-
ure to stop after accident, give name, etc. , 
or to render assistance, sufficiency of, 115 
A. L. R. 361. 
Necessity and sufficiency of showing in 
a criminal prosecution under a "hit-and• 
run" statute accused's knowledge of acci-
dent, injury, or damage, 23 A. L. R. 3d 
497. 
41-6-30. Involving damage to vehicle-Misdemeanor.-The driver of 
any vehicle involved in an accident r esulting only in damage to a vehicle 
which is driven or attended by any person shall immediately stop such 
vehicle at the scene of such accident or as close thereto as possible but 
shall forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene 
of such accident until he has fulfill ed the requirements of section 41-6-31. 
Every such stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is 
necessary. Any person failing to stop or comply with said requirements 
under such circumstances shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 20; C. 1943, 
57-7-97. 
41-6-31. Give name-Render assistance.-The driver of any vehicle in-
volved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or 
damage to any vehicle which is driven or attended by any person shall 
give his name, address, and the registration number of the vehicle he is 
driving and shall upon request and if available exhibit his operator's or 
chanffeur's license to the person struck or the driver or occupant of or 
person attending any vehicle collided with and shall render to any person 
injured in such accident reasonable assistance, including the carrying, or 
the making of arrangements for the carrying, of such person to a physician, 
surgeon, or hospital for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent 
that such treatment is necessary or if such carrying is requested by the 
injured person. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 21; C. 1943, 
57-7-98. 
Collateral References. 
Requirement that motorist r encler assist-
ance, 7 Am. Jur. 2d 803, Automobiles and 
Highway Traffic § 251. 
Validity ancl construction of statute 
making it a criminal offense for the oper-
ator of a motor vehicle not to carry or 
display his opera tor's license or the vehicle 
registration certificate, 6 A. L. R. 3d 506. 
41-6-32. Coilision with unattended vehicle.-The driver of any vehicle 
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stop and shall then and there either locate and notify the operat 
owner of such vehicle of the name and address of the driver and < 
of the vehicle striking the unattended vehicle or shall leave in a cm 
uous place in the vehicle struck a written notice giving the name 
address of the driver and of the owner of the vehicle doing the str 
and a statement of the circumstances thereof. 




60 C . .J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43. 
Liability for injury to child by 
mobile left una ttended in street or 
way, 140 A. L. R. 538. 
41-6-33. Involving :fixtures on or adjacent to highway.-The driver 
any vehicle involved in an accident resulting only in damage to :fixtu 
legally upon or adjacent to a highway shall take reasonable steps 
locate and notify the owner or person in charge of such property of st 
fact and of his name and address and of the registration number of t 
vehicle he is driving and shall upon request and if available exhibit l 
operator's or chauffeur's license and shall make report of such accide 
when and as required in section 41-6-35 hereof. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 23; C. 1943, 
57-7-100. 
41-6-34. Accidents involving injury, death, or damage of $100 or mor 
-Duty to notify police.-The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident re 
sulting in injury to or death of any person or property damage to ar 
apparent extent of $100 or more, shall immediately by the quickest means 
of communication give notice of such accident to the local police depart-
ment if such accident occurs within a municipality, otherwise to the office 
of the county sheriff or to a state trooper. 
H istory: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 24; C. 1943, 
57-7-101; L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1955 amendment inserted "or prop-
erty damage to an apparent extent of 
$100 or more," and substituted "state 
trooper" for "state highway patrolman." 
Cross-References. 
Failure to report accident, penalty, 41-
12-32. 
False or forged reports, penalty, 41-12-
32. 
41-6-35. Accident reports-Duty of driver, witnesses and investigating 
officer to forward or render.-(a) The driver of a vehicle involved in an 
accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or total property 
damage to the apparent extent of $100 or more shall within :five days 
after such accident forward a written report of such accident to the 
department. 
(b) The department may require any driver of a vehicle involved in 
an accident, of which report must be made as provided in this section, to 
file supplemental reports whenever the original report is insufficient in the 
opinion of the department and may require witnesses of accidents to 
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(c) Every law enforcement officer, who in the regular course of duty, 
investigates a motor vehicle accident of which report must be made as 
required in this section, either at the time of and at the scene of the 
accident or thereafter by interviewing participants or witnesses, shall, 
within twenty-four hours after completing such investigation, forward a 
written report of such accident to the department. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 25; C. 1943, 
57-7-102; L. 1949, ch. 65, § l; 1961, ch. 86, 
§ 1; 1969, ch. 106, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment substituted "five 
days" for "24 hours" in subsec. (a). 
The 1961 amendment substituted "$50" 
for "$25" in subsec. (a). 
The 1969 amendment substituted "$100" 
for "$50" in subsec. (a), and made minor 
changes in punctuation and phraseology 
throughout. 
1. Manslaughter. 
Acquittal under former statute was not 
bar to manslaughter prosecution. State v. 
Cheeseman, 63 U. 138, 223 P. 762, applying 
Comp. Laws 1917, § 3979. 
Collateral References. 
AutomobilesPlO. 
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43. 
Failure to comply with statute requiring 
one involved in automobile accident to 
stop or report as affecting question as to 
suspension or tolling statute of limitation, 
10 A. L. R. 2d 564. 
41-6-36. Physical incapacity of driver-Duty of o,ther occupants or 
owner to notify police and make reports.-(a) Whenever the driver of a 
vehicle is physically incapable of giving an immediate notice of an accident 
as required in section 41-6-34 and there was another occupant in the vehicle 
at the time of the accident capable of doing so, such occupant shall give or 
cause to be given the notice not given by the driver. 
(b) Whenever the driver is physically incapable of making a written 
report of an accident as required in section 41-6-35 and such driver is not 
the owner of the vehicle, then the owner of the vehicle involved in such ac-
cident shall within five days after learning of the accident make such report 
not made by the driver. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 26; C. 1943, 
57-7-103; L. 1949, ch. 65, § l; 1955, ch. 
71, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment designated the 
former section as subsec. (a); deleted "or 
written" appearing after "immediate" in 
subsec. (a); substituted "section 41-6-34" 
for "Sections 24 and 25" in subsec. (a); 
and added subsec. (b). 
The 1955 amendment substituted "no-
tice" for "report" twice in subsec. (a) . 
41-6-37. Forms-Contents-Penalties for failure to make report.-{a) 
The department shall prepare and upon request supply to police depart-
ments, justices of the peace, sheriffs, garages and other suitable agencies 
or individuals, forms for accident reports required hereunder, appropriate 
with respect to the persons required to make such reports and the pur-
poses to be served. The written reports to be made by persons involved 
in accidents and by investigating officers shall call for sufficiently detailed 
information to disclose with reference to a traffic accident the cause, con-
ditions then existing, and the persons and vehicles involved. 
(b) Every accident report required to be made in writing shall be 
made on the appropriate form approved by the department and shall 
contain all of the information required therein unless not available. 
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(c) E,very such report shall also contain information sufficient to e1 
able the department to determine whether the requirements for tli 
deposit of security under any of the la,vs of this state are inapplicabl 
by reason of the existence of insurance or other exceptions speci:fie, 
therein. 
( d) The department shall suspend the license or permit to drive arn 
any nonresident operating privileges of any person failing to report a1 
accident as herein provided until such report has been filed. The departmem 
may extend such suspension not to exceed 30 days. Any person convicteo 
of failing to make a report as required herein shall be punished as pro-
vided in section 41-6-164. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 27; C. 1943, 
57-7-104; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1961, ch. 
86, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 amendment added subsecs. (c) 
and (d). 
The 1961 amendment inserted the second 
sentence of subsec. (d). 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles~l0. 
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43. 
41-6-38. Livestock on highway-Collision, action for damages.-N o per-
son owning or controlling the possession of any livestock, shall willfully 
or negligently permit any such livestock to stray upon or remain Ull-
accompanied by a person in charge or control thereof upon a public 
highway, both sides of which are adjoined by property which is separated 
from such highway by a fence, wall, hedge, sidewalk, curb, lawn or 
building; provided, that the foregoing provision shall not apply to range 
stock drifting into any such highway in going to or returning from their 
accustomed ranges. No person shall drive any such livestock upon, over 
or across any public highway during the period from half an hour after 
sunset to half an hour before sunrise, without keeping a sufficient number 
of herders with warning lights on continual duty to open the road so as 
to permit the passage of vehicles. In any civil action brought by the 
owner, driver or occupant of a motor vehicle or by their personal repre-
sentatives or assignees, or by the owner of the livestock for damages 
caused by collision with any domestic animal or animals on a highway, 
there is no presumption that such collision was due to negligence on behalf 
of the owner or the person in possession of such livestock. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 28; C. 1943, 
57-7-105. 
Cross-Reference. 
Livestock highways, 27-12-117 et seq. 
1. No presumption provision. 
This provision is clear and unambiguous 
and in an action where plaintiff's motor-
cycle collided with a horse on a highway, 
it means that there is no presumption 
that the defendant was guilty in per-
mitting the horses to be upon the highway 
under the conditions they were found there 
and the burden rests upon the plaintiff to 
establish acts of negligence. Hyrum Smith 
Estate Co. v. Peterson, 227 F. 2d 442. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles~I0. 
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43. 
Lives tock or fowl on highway, liability 
for killing or injuring by motor vehicle, 
of, 20 A. L. R. 2d 1053. 
41-6-39. Garage keeper to report damaged vehiole.-The person in 
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vehicle which shows evidence of having been involved in an accident of 
which report must be made as provided in section 41-6-35, or struck by 
any bullet, shall report to the department within twenty-four hours after 
such motor vehicle is received, giving the engine number, registration num-
ber, and the name and address of the owner or operator of such vehicle. 
Collateral References. History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 29; C. 1943, 
57-7-106. 
Automobilese:=>363. 
"l C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 717. 
41-6-40. Accident reports - Confidential - Privileged - Certificate of 
compliance.-All accident reports made by persons involved in accidents 
or by garages shall be without prejudice to the individual so reporting 
and shall be for the confidential use of the department or other state 
agencies having use for the records for accident prevention purposes, or 
for the administration of the laws of this state relating to the deposit of 
security and proof of financial responsibility by persons driving or the 
owners of motor vehicles, except that the department may disclose the 
identity of a person involved in an accident when such identity is not 
otherwise known or when such person denies his presence at such acci-
dent. No such report shall be used as evidence in any trial, civil or 
criminal, arising out of an accident, except/ that the department shall 
furnish upon demand of any person who has, or claims to have, made 
such a r eport or, upon demand of any court, a certificate showing that 
a specified accident report has or has not been made to the department 
solely to prove a compliance or a failure to comply with the require-
ment that such a report be made to the department. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 30; C. 1943, 
57-7-107; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1, 
Compiler's Notes. · 
The 1949 amendment inserted "6r for 
the administration * * * motor vehicles," 
after "accident prevention purposes," in 
the first sentence. 
Cross-Reference. 
Financial responsibility division to fur-
nish copies of officers' reports on ac·ddents 
upon r equest, fees, 41-12-3.1. 
Collateral References. 
Auto mo bilese::a,10. 
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43. 
Stopping, identification, and a.id by mo-
torist after accident, 7 Ant ; Jur. 2d 799 
et seq., Automobiles and Highway Traffic 
§ 246 et seq. 
Admissibility of report of operator, filed 
pursuant to law, r especting auto mo bile 
accident, 69 A. L. R. 905. 
41-6-41. Statistical information published annually.-The department 
shall tabulate and may analyze all accident reports and shall publish 
annually, or at more frequent intervals, statistical information based 
thereon as to the number and circumstances of traffic accidents. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 31; C. 1943, 
57-7-108. 
41-6-42. Local powers.-Any incorporated city, tQwn, village, or other 
municipality may by ordinance -r,equire that the driver of a vehicle involved 
in an accident shall also file wi'th the designated city department a report 






the department . .All such reports shall be for the confidential use of the 
city department and subject to the provisions of section 41-6-40. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 32; C. 1943, 
57-7-109. 
ARTICLE 5 
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS DRIVING 
Section 41-6-43. Powers of local authorities. 
41-6-43.10. Negligent homicide--Death occurring within one year-Penalty-
Revocation of license or privilege to drive. 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor-Presumption 
arising from alcoholi<; content of blood-Driving under the in-
fluence of drugs-Criminal punishment-Revocation of license-
Arrest without warrant. 
41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcoholic content of blood-
Refusal to allow-Revocation of license-Court action on revoca-
tion-Person incapable of refusal-Results of test available-Who may give test. 
41-6-45. Reckless driving-Penalty, 
41-6-43. Powers of local authorities.-(a) Local authorities may by 
ordinance provide that it shall be unlawful for any person who is under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor or is an habitual user or under the influence 
of any narcotic drugs or any other drug to a degree which renders him 
incapable of safely driving a vehicle to drive or be in actual physical con-
trol of any vehicle, for the use of chemical tests and for evidentiary pre-
sumptions, and for penalties therefor as a first offense consistent with section 41-6-44. 
(b) Local authorities may also by ordinance provide that any person 
who drives any vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of 
persons or property is guilty of reckless driving, and provide penalties 
therefor as a first offense consistent with section 41-6-45. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 33; C. 1943, 
57-7-110; L. 1957, ch. 75, § 1; 1967, ch. 
88, § 1; 1969, ch. 107, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1957 amendment made no change in 
this section. 
Prior to the 1967 amendment, subsec. 
(a) read: "Local authorities may by ordi-
nance provide that it sl1all be unlawful 
for any person who is an habitual user 
of narcotic drugs or any person who is 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor 
or narcotic drugs to drive or be in actual 
physical control of any vehicle, and pro-
vide penalties therefor as a first offense 
consistent with section 41-6-44." 
Tl1e 1969 amendment, in subsec. (a), 
inserted "for the use of chemical tests and 
for evidentiary presumptions" after "any 
vehicle" and made minor changes in punc-
tuation and phraseology. 
Cross-Reference. 
Traffic regulations, powers and duties of 
cities as to, 10-8-30. 
1. Powers of cities. 
City held to have power to pass ordi-
nance prohibiting driving while intoxicat-
·ed, notwithstanding statute on the subject. 




61 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 625-630. 
Driving while intoxicated or under in• 
fluence of liquor or drugs, 7 Am. Jur. 2d 
805 et seq., Automobiles and Highway 
Traffic § 253 et seq. 
Constitutionality of legislative delega• 
tion of powers to prescribe or vary regu-
lations concerning motor vehicles used on 
highways, 87 A. L. R. 546. 
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41-6-43.10. Negligent homicide - Death occurring within one year-
Penalty-Revocation of license or privilege to drive.-(a) When the death 
of any person ensues within one year as a proximate result of injury re-
ceived by the driving of any vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety of 
others, the person so operating such vehicle shall be guilty of negligent 
homicide. 
(b) Any person convicted of negligent homicide shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year or by fine of not 
less than $100 nor more than $1,000, or both such fine and imprisonment. 
(c) The department shall revoke the license or permit to drive and 
any nonresident operating privilege of any person convicted of negligent 
homicide. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-43.10, enacted by 
L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1; L. 1957, ch. 78, § 2. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1957 amendment inserted "in the 
county jail'' after "imprisonment" in sub-
sec. (b). 
Title of Act. 
An act amending sections 41-6-6, 41-6-7, 
41-6-8, 41-6-9, 41-6-34, 41-6-36, 41-6-47, 41-
6-49, 41-6-70, 41-6-76, 41-6-77, 41-6-82, 41-6- , 
90, 41-6-114, 41-6-117, 41-6-120, 41-6-121, 
41-6-123, 41-6-124, 41-6-129, 41-6-131, 41-6- · 
133, 41-6-141, 41-6-142, 41-6-149, 41-6-159, 
·and 27-1-28, Utah Code Annotated 1953; 
repealing and re-enacting sections 41-6-14, 
41-6-64, 41-6-130, 41-6-132, 41-6-134, 41-6-
135, 41-6-140, and 41-6-144, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953; enacting new sections 
41-6-43.10, 41-6-72.10, 41-6-121.10, 41-6-
. 140.10, 41-6-140.20, and 41-6-154.10, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953; and repealing sec-
tion 27-9-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953; 
relating to the regulation of traffic on 
highways, and defining certain crimes in 
the use and operation of vehicles, pre-
scribing the equipment used on vehicles 
and requiring the giving of notice of acci-
dents by operators or occupants of motor 
vehicles involved. 
Cross-Reference. 
Automobile homicide, 76-30-7.4. 
1. Construction. 
A defendant is guilty of reckless dis-
regard for the safety of others if the 
evidence supports a finding that the de-
fendant consciously chose a course of 
action knowing that such course would 
place his guest in grave and serious danger 
· or with knowledge of facts which would 
disclose such danger to any reasonable per-
son. This does not require a finding that 
defendant was fully conscious of the great 
danger to others since the statute does not 
require an intentional accident nor the 
choosing _ of , a highly dangerous course 
while fully conscious or aware of the 
danger in following such course. State v. 
Berchtold, 11 U. (2d) 208, 357 P. 2d 183. 
Inattentive driving in the face of grave 
danger constitutes reckless disregard for 
the safety of others. State v. Berchtold, 
11 U. (2d) 208, 357 P. 2d 183. 
The term "reckless disregard" requires 
a much greater degree of disregard for the 
safety of others than does ordinary lack 
of due care for such safety, or mere 
negligence. State v. Berchtold, 11 U. (2d) 
208, 357 P. 2d 183. 
2. Double jeopardy. 
Where a defendant originally was 
charged with negligent homicide under 
this section and, after a preliminary hear-
ing, the charge was dismissed and he was 
charged, tried, and convicted of automobile 
homicide under 76-30-7.4, he was not placed 
twice in jeopardy by being tried for auto-
mo bile homicide after dismissal of the 
lesser charge. State v. Romero, 12 U. (2d) 
210, 364 P. 2d 828. 
3. Evidence. 
Where a defendant was charged with 
negligent homicide because he ran a red 
light and was involved in an intersection 
collision, he should have been allowed to 
introduce evidence of other similar acci-
dents occurring at the same intersection, 
and the city traffic engineer, as an expert, 
should have been permitted to testify as to 
the lenses in the semaphore signal and 
their tendency to cause "sun phantom." 
State v . Stewart, 12 U. (2d) 273, 365 P. 2d 
785. 
Where the evidence showed that from 
the length of defendant's skid marks 
the police estimated his speed to have been 
55 to 65 miles per hour at the time his 
auto struck and killed a pedestrian in a 
35-mile-per-hour zone, and that the defend-
ant was familiar with the area and should 
have realized that people might be crossing 
the highway in the area, there was suffi-
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could base its finding that defendant was 
guilty of negligent homicide. State v. 
Park, 17 U. (2d) 90, 404 P. 2d 677. 
Where evidence showed that defendant 
knew of stop sign and restricted view at 
intersection where the collision occurred, 
and that, whether or not defendant ran 
the stop sign, he was traveling in excess 
of forty miles per hour when he reached 
the point of impact, and that the two 
vehicles were so close together when de-
fendant entered the intersection that the 
driver of the other auto h ad no oppor-
tunity to apply her brakes prior to the 
collision, such evidence was sufficient to 
show conduct evincing a reckless disregard 
for the safety of others. State v. Selman, 
18 U. (2d) 199, 417 P. 2d 975. 
4. View of tragedy. 
Defendant, convicted of negligent homi-
cide by automobile under this section, was 
not prejudiced because, at the instance 
of the state, a view by the jury o 
site of the tragedy was had under 77-
and the participation of the trial 
th ereat in asking numerous questio~ 
prosecution witnesses, where the n 
showed that the judge showed unt 
sympathy for defendant, an apparent 
rodder, including the sentencing of 
fondant to but sixty days, servable 
week ends. State v. Delaney, 15 U. ( 
338, 393 P. 2d 379. 
Collateral References. 
Automobilese::,342, 344. 
61 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 657-671. 
7 Am. Jur. 2d 831, Automobiles a1 
Highway Traffic § 283. 
What amounts to negligent homicid 
within meaning of statutes penalizing nee 
ligent homicide by operation of a moto 
vehicle, 20 A. L. R. 3d 473. 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor-Presump-
tion arising from alcoholic content of blood-Driving under the influence 
of drugs-Criminal punishment-Revocation of license-Arrest without 
warrant.-(a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in subsection 
( d ) of this section for any person who is under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor to drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle within this 
state. 
(b) In any criminal prosecution for a violation of subsection (a) of 
this section relating to driving a vehicle while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor or in any civil suit or proceeding arising out of acts 
alleged to have been committed by any person while driving or in actual 
physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor, the amount of alcohol in the person's blood at the time- alleged as 
shown by chemical analysis of the person's blood, breath, or other bodily 
substance shall give rise to the following presumptions: 
1. If there was at that time 0.05 per cent or less by weight of alcohol 
in the person's blood, it shall be presumed that the person was not under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor; 
2. If there was at that time in excess of 0.05 per cent but less than 
0.08 per cent by weight of alcohol in . the person's blood, such fact shall 
not give rise to any presumption that ·the person was or was not under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor, but such fact may be considered with 
other competent evidence in determining whether the person was under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor; 
3. If there was at the time 0.08 per cent or more by weight of alcohol 
in the person's blood, it shall be presumed that the person was under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor; 
4. The foregoing provisions of this subdivision shall not be construed 
as limiting the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon 
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the question whether or not the person was under the influence of intoxi. 
eating liquor. 
(c) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in subsection (d) of this 
section for any person who is an habitual user of or under the influence 
of any narcotic drug or any other drug to a degree which renders him 
incapable of safely driving a vehicle to drive or be in actual physical 
control of a vehicle within this state. The fact that any person charged 
with a violation of this subsection is or has been entitled to use such 
drug under the laws of this state shall not constitute a defense against any 
charge of violating this subsection. 
(d) Every person who is convicted of a violation of this section shall 
be punished by imprisonment for not less than thirty days nor more than 
6 months, or by a fine of not less than $100 nor more than $299, or by both 
such fine and imprisonment; provided that in the event such person shall 
have inflicted a bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having 
operated said vehicle in a reckless or negligent manner or with a wanton 
or reckless disregard of human life or safety, he shall be punished by im-
prisonment in the county jail for not more than one year , and, in the 
discretion of the court, by a fine of not more than $1,000. 
(e) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a vio-
lation of this section when such violation is coupled with an accident or 
collision in which such person is involved and when such violation has in 
fact been committed, although not in his presence, when the officer has 
reasonable cause to believe that the violation was committed by such 
person. 
The department shall revoke the operator's or chauffeur's license of any 
person convicted under this section. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 34; C. 
1943, 57-7-111; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1957, 
ch. 75, § 1; 1967, ch. 88, § 2; 1969, ch. 
107, § 2. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1949 a mendment rewrote subsec. (b) 
and added subds. 1, 2, 3 and 4 thereto. 
The amendment also added subsecs. (c) 
and (d), ancl made other changes in 
phraseology. 
The 1957 amendment deleted "upon a 
first conviction" after "punished" the first 
time it appears in subsec. (d) and substi-
tuted the proviso for provisions applying 
to second or subsequent convictions and 
deleted "or under an ordinance as pro-
vided by section 41-6-43 (a)" at the end 
of the section. 
The 1967 amendment, in subsec. (a), 
deleted "an habitual user of narcotic 
drugs or any person who is" after "person 
who is" and deleted "or narcotic drugs" 
after "intoxicating liquor"; in sub secs. 
(b) and (d), substituted "person" and 
"person's" for "defendant" and "defend-
ant's" where the references appear; in 
subparagraphs 2 and 3 of subsec. (b), 
substituted "0.08 per cent" for "0.15 per 
cent"; in subsec. ( c), substituted "section" 
for "subsection" before "for any person," 
cleletecl "who is under the influence of" 
following "narcotic drug or" and inserted 
"or be in a ctual physical control" follow-
ing "to drive"; in subsec. (cl), substituted 
"nor" for "or" after "$100" and inserted 
"by" before "a fine"; and the amendment 
added subsec. (e). 
The 1969 amendment, in sub sec. (b), in-
serted "or in any civil suit * * * under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor" and de-
leted "urine" before "breath" in the first 
sentence; in subsec. (b), 2, substituted 
"whether the person was under the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquor" for "the 
guilt or innocence of the person"; and 
made minor changes in punctuation and 
phraseology throughout. 
1. Constitutionality. 
It is within the prerogative of the legis-
lature to make it unlawful for one to drive 
a vehicle while under the influence of 
liquor and to provide a greater penalty if, 
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while doing so, he injures another by 
recklessness or negligence. State v. Bren-
nan, 13 U. (2d) 195, 371 P. 2d 27. 
This section does not deal with two 
separate subjects and thus transgress 
Const., Art. 1, § 12 which requires that 
legislative acts must contain only one 
subject. State v. Brennan, 13 U. (2d) 195, 
371 P . 2d 27. 
·2. Blood-alcohol test. 
Where officer testified that he obtained 
the defendant's consent to the taking of a 
blood-alcohol test, which fact was also 
attested by the nurse and by the physician 
who took the blood sample, the evidence 
left no doubt that defendant gave his 
consent to such a test. State v. Bryan, 16 
U. (2d) 47, 395 P. 2d 539. 
After an accused has been lawfully 
placed under arrest it is the duty of the 
officers to make a search for evidence 
relative to the commission of the crime. 
The blood-alcohol test is designed for that 
purpose. State v. Bryan, 16 U. (2d) 47, 
395 P. 2d 539. 
3. Delay in arrest. 
Where law enforcement officers on ar-
riving at scene of automobile collision 
found injured defendant sitting on curb 
and took him to a nearby hospital for 
treatment of his wounds before making 
arrest, the delay in the arrest was not un-
reasonable. State v. Bryan, 16 U. (2d) 47, 
395 P. 2d 539. 
4. Double jeopardy. 
In a prosecution for violating this sec-
tion, although court erred in refusing 
state's request to submit case to jury on 
included offense of drunken driving, double 
jeopardy did not permit further proceed-
ings against defendant. State v. Brennan, 
13 U. (2d) 195, 371 P. 2d 27. 
5. Included offense. 
Subdivision (a) of this section prohibits 
the driving of a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of liquor as a separate of-
fense, with a separate punishment as a 
misdemeanor as set forth in subdivision 
( d); and it is necessarily included in the 
greater offense of driving while intoxi-
cated and injuring another in a reckless 
or negligent manner, which is punishable 
as an indictable misdemeanor. State v. 
Brennan, 13 U. (2d) 195, 371 P. 2d 27. 
6. Public intoxication. 
Following an automobile collision de-
fendant was sitting on curb holding a 
handkerchief to his head which was bleed-
mg; there was a strong odor of alcohol on 
his breath; he appeared to be intoxicated, 
and in fact stated that he was drunk. A 
bottle containing whiskey was foun 
the floor of his a utomobile. He was t. 
to a nearby hospital where his wo 
were attended and he was placed u: 
arrest under this section for operatin 
motor vehicle while intoxicated. Ui 
such circumstances arrest of defendant 
justified though offense for which he · 
arrested was not committed in the p; 
ence of the arresting officer, the defend: 
being intoxicated in a public place in v 
lation of 32-7-13, and upon death of i 
passengers, he was charged with auton 
bile homicide under 76-30-7.4. State 
Bryan, 16 U. (2d) 47, 395 P. 2d 539. 
7. Conflict between state and city author 
ties. 
City held to have power to pass 01 
dinance prohibiting driving while in 
toxicated, notwithstanding statute on th( 
subject. Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 97 U. 
113, 93 P. 2d 671. 
If city ordinance prescribes the punish-
ment for drunken driving as confinement 
in city jail, court or judge is without 
authority to order confinement in county 
jail. Ex parte Folck, 102 U. 470, 132 P. 
2d 130. 
Where evidence is conflicting, it is for 
the jury to say whether defendant was 
guilty of driving a vehicle while under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor. State 
v . Stewart, 110 U. 203, 171 P. 2d 383, 
Conviction of the crime of involuntary 
manslaughter as the result of a collision 
between an automobile, which defendant 
was driving, and a pedestrian was upheld, 
where evidence showed that he had im-
bibed to such a degree that it was ap• 
parent to all who saw and heard him that 
his locomotion and his power of speech 
were markedly affected, and it appeared 
that such criminal negligence contributed 
to the death. A person who drives a car 
while in such a condition is reckless and 
evinces a marked disregard for the safety 
of others and is therefore guilty of crim-
inal negligence. State v. Capps, lll U. 
189, 176 P. 2d 873. 
8. Proof to sustain conviction. 
Under former subsec. (a) "operating an 
automobile on a public street or highway 
by one under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor is itself an unlawful act and an 
offense." But a conviction of involuntary 
manslaughter will be reversed unless the 
charge is sufficiently proven. State v. 
Johnson, 76 U. 84, 88, 287 P. 909, over-
ruled on other grounds in State v. Crank, 
105 U. 332, 355, 142 P. 2d 178, 188, 170 
A. L. R. 542. 
Testimony that three or four hours 
after accident liquor was detected by 
odor on defendant's breath does not prove 
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the charge of drunken driving, and "driv-
ing an automobile in violation of traffic 
rules or ordinances in one or more par-
ticulars, or driving it negligently or even 
recklessly, resulting in an accident, does 
not relevantly tend to prove that the 
driver was under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor." State v. Johnson, 76 U. 
84, 88, 287 P. 909, overruled on other 
grounds in State v. Crank, 105 U. 332, 355, 
142 P. 2d 178, 188, 170 A. L. R. 542. 
9. Proof of prior convictions. 
Upon trial of information for drunken 
driving, introduction of evidence of prior 
convictions before a determination of the 
issue on the substantive charge, even if 
erroneous, would not warrant directing an 
acquittal, and evidence of prior conviction 
is admissible, even though conviction fol-
lowed plea of guilty. However, conviction 
after a plea of guilty is nevertheless a 
prior conviction and may be shown under 
proper procedure. But until a verdict has 
been rendered on the principal issue, there 
is no occasion to mention prior convictions, 
since previous offenses would not be com-
petent to prove that defendant committed 
the offense for which he is then on trial. 
State v. Stewart, 110 U. 203, 171 P. 2d 
383, pointing out manner of showing prior 
convictions from the records of justice 
and city courts, notwithstanding infor-
mality of proceedings in such courts and 
lack of judgment book. 
Where the defendant is charged with 
ri prior conviction of driving while under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor it is 
incumbent upon the state to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt the prior conviction. 
It was then the exclusive province of the 
jury to determine from the evidence 
whether the state had done so. The trial 
court's comments on the evidence and his 
limiting the jury's deliberation to whether 
the record of the prior conviction was 
authentic was error prejudicial to defend-
ant. State v. H a rris, 1 U. (2d) 182, 264 
P. 2d 284, 39 A. L. R. 2d 553 . 
Upon information charging defendant 
with driving under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor and with commission of prior 
offense, where the docket of the justice 
of the peace was received in evidence, the 
page identified and th e verity of the entry 
stipulated to in open court as being in 
the handwriting of the justice, the entry, 
under section 78-5-16, became prima facie 
evidence of the facts so stated, and no 
evidence to the contrary having been 
offered, must be presumed to be correct 
ancl sustains the court's finding of guilt 
of prior conviction. State v. Bailey, 3 U. 
(2d) 254, 282 P. 2d 3?9. 
10. Procedure to be followed where prior 
convictions alleged. 
As a guide for future cases, where there 
is an allega tion of prior crimes or prior 
convictions, the Supreme Court has out-
lined the procedure to be followed in the 
trial courts, which will properly expedite 
the adjudication of such cases, while at 
the same time safeguarding the substantial 
rights of accused persons, and prevent an 
accused person from being advertised to 
the jury as one who previously perpetrated 
a similar type of offense. State v. Stewart, 
110 U. 203, 171 P. 2d 383, setting out the 
procedure at length, following Connecticut 
cases. For a full recitation of this proce-
dure, see 76-1-18. 
11. Venue. 
Where the testimony adequately estab-
lished where the offense was committed, 
the court will take judicial notice that 
that point is in the county so that the 
venue has been suffi.ciently established. 




61 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 628. 
7 Am. Jur. 2d 805-814, Automobiles and 
Highway Traffic §§ 253-262. 
Admissibility and weight of evidence 
based on scientific test for intoxication 
or presence of alcohol in system, 127 A. L. 
R. 1513, 159 A. L. R. 209. 
Admissibility, in vehicle accident case, 
of evidence of opposing party's intoxica-
tion where litigant's pleading failed to al-
lege such fact, 26 A. L. R. 2d 359. 
Admissibility of hospital record relating 
to intoxication or sobriety of patient, 38 
A. L. R. 2d 778. 
Constitutionality and effect of statute 
relating to civil liability of person driving 
automobile while under influence of liquor, 
56 A. L. R. 327. 
Degree or nature of intoxication for 
purposes of statute or ordinance making 
it a criminal offense to operate an auto-
mobile while in that condition, 142 A. L. 
R. 555. 
Driving automob,ile while intoxicated as 
a substantive criminal offense, 42 A . L. R. 
1498, 49 A. L. R. 1392, 68 A . L. R. 1356, 
142 A. L. R. 555. 
Drugs, driving under the influence, or 
when addicted to use of as criminal offense, 
17 A. L. R. 3d 815. 
Intoxication from specified percentages 
of alcohol present in system, construction 
and application of statutes creating pre-
sumption or other inference, 16 A. L. R . 
3d 748. 
235 
41-6-44.10 MOTOR VEHICLES 
What constitutes driving, being in con-
trol of, or operating a motor vehicle within 
statute making such act, while intoxicated, 
an offense, 47 A. L. R. 2d 570. 
What i s "motor vehicle" within statt 
making it offense to drive while int( 
cated, 66 A. L. R. 2d 1146. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Proof of intoxication. 
In a prosecution for automobile homicide 
where there was competent, substantial, 
expert testimony that defendant's alcohol-
blood content was not only 0.15, but 0.224, 
which would impair motor and sensory 
reactions, an instruction by the court th: 
0.15 alcohol-blood content raised a pr, 
sumption that one would be under th 
influence was not prejudicial. State , 
Romero, 12 U. (2d) 210, 364 P. 2d 828. 
41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcoholic content of 
blood-Refusal to allow-Revocation of license-Court action on revocation 
-Person incapable o.f refusal-Results of test available-Who may give 
test.-(a) Any person operating a motor vehicle in this state shall be 
deemed to have given his consent to a chemical test of his breath or blood 
for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood, provided 
that such test is administered at the direction of a peace officer having 
reasonable grounds to believe such person to have been driving in an 
intoxicated condition. The arresting officer shall determine within reason 
which of the aforesaid tests shall be administered. 
(b) Any person operating a motor vehicle in this state shall be 
determined to have given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his 
blood or urine :for the purpose of determining whether he was driving or 
was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence 
of any narcotic drug or other drug if arrested for any offense where, at 
the time of arrest, the arresting officer has reasonable grounds to believe 
such person to have been driving or in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of a narcotic drug or other drug. 
( c) If such person has been placed under arrest and has thereafter 
been requested to submit to any one of the chemical tests provided for in 
subsections (a) or (b) of this section and refuses to submit to such 
chemical test, the test shall not be given and the arresting officer shall 
advise the person of his rights under this section. Within twenty days 
after receiving an affidavit from the arresting officer to the effect that such 
person has refused a chemical test the department shall notify such person 
of a hearing before the department. If at said hearing the department 
determines that the person was granted the right to submit to a chemical 
test and without reasonable cause refused to submit to such test, or if 
such person fails to appear before the department as required in the notice, 
the department shall revoke for one year his license or permit to drive. 
Any person whose license has been revoked by the department under the 
provisions of this section shall have the right to file a petition within 
thirty days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in the district court 
in the county in which such person shall reside. Such court is hereby 
vested with jurisdiction, and it shall be its duty to set the matter for trial 
de novo upon ten days' written notice to the department and thereupon to 
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whether the petitioner's license is subject to revocation under the provisions 
of this act. 
(d) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition 
rendering him incapable of refusal to submit to any such chemical test 
or tests shall be deemed not to have withdrawn the consent provided for in 
subsections (a) or (b) of this section, and the test or tests may be admin-
istered whether such person has been arrested or not. 
(e) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of such 
test shall be made available to him. 
(f) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse or duly au-
thorized laboratory technician, acting at the r equest of a police officer 
can withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic or drug 
content therein. This limitation shall not apply to the taking of a urine or 
breath specimen. Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse or 
duly authorized laboratory technician who, at the direction of a peace 
officer, draws a sample of blood from any person whom the peace officer 
has reason to believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital 
or medical facility at which such sample is drawn, shall be immune from any 
civil or criminal liability arising therefrom, provided such test is ad-
ministered according to standard medical practice. 
(g) The person tested shall be permitted to have a physician of his 
own choosing administer a chemical test in addition to the one administered 
at the direction of the peace officer. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.10, enacted by 
L. 1957, ch. 80, § [1]; L. 1959, ch. 65, § 1; 
1967, ch. 88, § 3; 1969, ch. 107, § 3. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1959 amendment deleted references 
to a chemical test of saliva in former 
subsecs. (a) and (c); deleted a former 
third sentence which read: "In such event 
the department shall revoke, for one year, 
his license or permit to drive" and in-
serted the third and fourth sentences; 
deleted references to can cellation or sus-
pension of licenses in the last sentence 
of former subsec. (a) and made other 
minor changes in phraseology and punc-
tuation. 
The 1967 amendment, in former subsec. 
(a), substituted "peace officer" for "police 
officer" and deleted a clause from the encl 
of the first sentence which read: " and in 
accordance with the rules and regulations 
established by the department," inserted 
the second sentence, added "and the ar-
resting officer shall ad vise the pel'Son of 
his rights under the section" at the end 
of the third sentence and rewrote the 
fourth sentence without making · a substan-
tial change in its provisions; in former 
subsec. ( c), inserted "registered nurse, 
practical nurse" in the first sentence and 
added the third sentence; and, in former 
sub sec. ( cl) substituted "peace officer" for 
"police officer." 
The 1969 amendment inserted subsecs . 
(b) and (d), divided former subsec. (a) 
into present subsecs. (a) and (c); in pres-
ent subsec. (a), substituted "breath or 
blood" for "breath, b lood or urine"; in 
subsec. (c), inserted "provided for in sub-
sections (a) or (b) of this section"; re-
designated former subsecs. (b) to ( d) as 
( e) to (g); in subsec. (f), inserted "or 
drug" after "alcoholic"; and made minor 
changes in punctuation and phraseology in 
sub sec. ( c) . 
Title of Act. 
An act creating a new section to be 
known as 41-6-44.10, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, relating to chemical tests for persons 
suspected of operating a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol. 
1. Constitutionality-standing to raise. 
Motorist who submitted to b lood-a lcohol 
test and was convicted of driving while in-
toxicated h ad no standing to challenge 
constitutionality of t his section, not hav-
ing been convicted under or by reason of 
it. Salt Lake City v. P erkins, 9 U. (2d) 
317, 343 P. 2cl 1106. 
2. Prerequisites for admission into evi-
dence. 
Chemical test could not be taken with-
out driver's consent prior to his arrest, so 
that district cou1·t erred in admitting re-
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sults of test in prosecution for automobile 
homicide where defendant had objected to 
taking of blood sample and was not, at 
time blood sample was extracted, under 
arrest. State v. Cruz, 21 U. (2d) 406, 446 
P. 2d 307. 
3. Choice of tests. 
The 1959 amendment to this section did 
not change the section so as to alter the 
court's interpretation that the choice of 
chemical tests is to be made by the driver 
and not by the officer and, where an officer 
failed to give the driver his choice of tests, 
he failed to comply with the statute and 
revocation of the driver's license under the 
implied consent law was invalid. Bean v. 
State, 12 U. (2d) 76, 362 P. 2d 750. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Construction and application. 
A person is deemed to give his consent 
to a chemical test of some one of the des-
ignated substances, breath, blood, urine, or 
saliva, but not all of them; and where a 
motorist, arrested by an officer on the sus-
picion of being intoxicated, was advised 
that he must submit to a blood test or his 
license would be revoked, it was not in ac• 
cordance with the statute and there was no 
proper basis for revoking his license. Ring• 
wood v. State, 8 U. (2d) 287, 333 P. 2d 
943. 
Evidence. 
Prior to the enactment of this section 
it was held, in an action against the 
estate of a deceased for injuries arising 
out of an automobile accident, that the 
testimony of a doctor who made a blood 
test from blood taken from the deceased's 
body without the consent of the deceased's 
parents was admissible in evidence. Fretz 
v. Anderson, 5 U. (2d) 290, 300 P. 2d 642, 
646. 
41-6-45. Reckless driving-Penalty.-(a) Any person who drives any 
vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property 
is guilty of reckless driving. 
(b) Every person convicted of reckless driving shall be punished 
upon a first conviction by imprisonment for a period of not less than 
five days nor more than six months or by a fine of not less than $25 nor 
more than $299, or by both such fine and imprisonment. On a second 
or subsequent conviction, or on a conviction under this section subse-
quent to a conviction under an ordinance as provided in section 41-6-43 (b), 
he shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten days nor more 
than six months, or by a fine of not less than $50 nor more than $1,000 or 
by both such fine and imprisonment. For the purpose of this section such 
second violation shall have occurred within three years of the preceding 
violation. The department shall suspend for a period not exceeding three 
months, the operator's or chauffeur's license of any person convicted upon 
three charges of reckless driving committed within a period of twelve 
months; provided, however, that if, upon a first or second conviction the jus-
tice or judge shall recommend suspension of the convicted person's license, 
the department shall suspend the said license for a period not to exceed 
three months. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 35; C. 1943, 
57-7-112. 
Cross-Reference. 
Reckless driving as misdemeanor, 76-49· 
1. 
1. Former jeopardy. 
Conviction of motorist for reckless 
driving held not bar to subsequent prose• 
cution for involuntary manslaughter. State 
v. Empey, 65 U. 609, 239 P. 25, 44 A. L. 
R. 558, r eviewed in State v. Thatcher, 
108 U. 63, 157 P. 2d 258. 
Collateral References. 
Automobiles¢::>330. 
61 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 609-624. 
Reckless driving, 7 Am. Jur. 2d 815 et 
seq., Automobiles and Highway Traffic 
§ 263 et seq. 
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"Assured clear distance ahead" or "ra-
dius of lights" application of doctrine 
to accident involving pedestrian crossing 
street or highway, 31 A. L. R . 2d 1424. 
Excuse for exceeding speed limit for 
automobiles, 29 A. L. R. 883. 
Homicide or assault in connection with 
operation of automobile at unlawful speed, 
99 A. L . R. 756. 
"Residence district," "business district," 
"school area," and the like, in statut es 
and ordinances regulating speed of motor 
vehicles, 50 A. L . R. 2d 343. 
Statute prohibiting reckless driving; 
definiteness and certainty, 12 A. L . R. 2d 
580. 
Validity of statute or ordinance forbid-
ding rnnning of automobile so as to in-
flict damage or injury, 47 A. L . R. 255. 
What amounts to reckless driving, 86 A. 
L . R. 1273, 52 A. L. R. 2d 1337. 
When automobile is under control, 28 A. 
L . R. 952. 
ARTICLE 6 
SPEED RESTRICTIONS 
Section 41-6-46. Speed regulations - Maximum speeds - School buildings - Intersec-
tions, crossings, and curves-Emergency power of the governor. 
41-6-47. Prima facie limit. 
41-6-48. Speed restrictions- Powers of local authorities. 
41-6-49. Minimum speed regulations. 
41-6-50. Special speed limit on bridges-Prima facie evidence. 
41-6-51. Speed contest or exhibition on highway-Barricade or obstruction 
therefor. 
41-6-52. Violation- Pleading. 
41-6-52.1. Resume speed road sign. 
41-6-46. Speed regulations - Maximum speeds - School buildings -
Intersections, crossings, and curves - Emergency power of the governor.-
( 1) No person shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater 
than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having re-
gard to the actual and potential hazards then existing. In every event 
speed shall be so controlled as may be necessary to avoid colliding with 
any person, vehicle, or other conveyance on or entering the highway in 
compliance with legal requirements and the duty of all persons to use due 
care. 
(2) Where no special hazard exists the following speeds shall be lawful 
but any speed in excess of said limits shall be prima facie evidence that 
the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful: 
(a) Twenty miles per hour. 
When passing a school building or the grounds thereof during school 
recess or while children are going to or leaving school during opening or 
closing hours; provided, that local authorities may require a complete 
stop before passing a school building or grounds at any of said periods. 
(b) Twenty-five miles per hour in any business or residential district. 
( c) Sixty miles per hour in other locations during the daytime. 
(d) Fifty miles per hour in such other locations during the nighttime. 
Daytime means from half hour before sunrise to half hour after sunset. 
Nighttime means at any other hour. 
(3) The driver of every vehicle shall, consistent with the requirements 
of subdivision (1) of this section, drive at an appropriate r educed speed 
when approaching and crossing an intersection or railway grade crossing, 
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